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“IMPORTING” RESTRICTIONS FROM ONE
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE PROVISION
TO ANOTHER: THE LIMITS OF LEGITIMATE
CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION
IN THE AGE OF STATUTES
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED*
[T]he meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on
context.
— King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital1
No statute is an island unto itself.

— United States v. Collins 2

Introduction
Until 1975, the federal law of evidence was largely common law in form.
However, in 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence took effect. 3 The current,
restyled version of Federal Rule of Evidence 402 reads:

* Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Davis
School of Law; former chair, Evidence Section, American Association of Law Schools.
1. 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991).
2. 859 F.3d 1207, 1213 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Brune, 767 F.3d
1009, 1022 (10th Cir. 2014)).
3. RONALD L. CARLSON, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, JULIE SEAMAN & ERICA BEECHERMONAS, EVIDENCE : TEACHING M ATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 15 (8th ed.
2018).
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Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following
provides otherwise:
$

the United States Constitution;

$

a federal statute;

$

these rules; or

$

other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.4

Rule 101(b)(5) states that a “‘rule prescribed by the Supreme Court’
means a rule adopted by the Supreme Court under statutory authority,” 5
such as the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure. Conspicuously absent
from the list in Rule 402 is any mention of case or decisional law. That
omission implies that federal courts no longer possess the common-law
authority to create or enforce uncodified exclusionary rules. The Congress
that enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence was a legislature jealous of its
constitutional prerogatives, in part because it had recently battled Richard
Nixon over claims of executive privilege in federal court during the
Watergate investigation.6 Three years after the enactment of the rules, the
late Professor Edward Cleary, the Reporter for the Advisory Committee
which drafted the rules, wrote: “In principle, under the Federal Rules no
common law of evidence remains.”7 On two occasions, the United States
Supreme Court has approvingly quoted that very passage.8
Most articles in the Federal Rules of Evidence contain several
provisions. For example, Article VI lists multiple impeachment techniques.9
4. FED. R. EVID. 402.
5. Id. 105(b)(5).
6. 26 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE : EVIDENCE § 5661, at 465–67 (1992); 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW
WIGMORE : A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 4.2.2.a, at 247 (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter
IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE ].
7. Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L.
REV. 908, 915 (1978).
8. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587–88 (1993); United States v.
Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51–52 (1984); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of
Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 REV. LITIG. 129, 129 (1987) (“In each case
documented in his article, Professor Rossi pointed to express language in the Rules’ text or
legislative history which manifested an intent to abolish a restrictive, common-law
evidentiary rule.”) (citing Faust F. Rossi, The Silent Revolution, LITIG., Winter 1983, at 13,
13–19) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402].
9. FED. R. EVID. 608 (character for untruthfulness); id. 609 (prior conviction); id. 610
(religious beliefs); id. 613 (prior inconsistent statements).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss2/2

2020] LIMITS OF LEGITIMATE CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION 233
Article VII includes Rule 703, which recognizes several different sources of
information that an expert may rely on as a factual basis for an opinion. 10
For its part, Article VIII contains a large number of hearsay exemptions and
exceptions.11 In Article IX, Rule 901(b) illustrates adequate authentication
foundations,12 while Rule 902 catalogues a number of techniques for
rendering an exhibit self-authenticating.13 Finally, Article X, which governs
the Best Evidence Rule, lists a number of excuses for nonproduction—that
is, acceptable explanations for the proponent’s failure to produce an
original writing at trial.14
These evidentiary doctrines are set out in physically separate
provisions—suggesting that the drafters intended for them to operate
independently,15 functioning as distinct theories of admissibility. Thus, even
if the proponent could not produce a conviction to impeach a witness under
Rule 609,16 the proponent might be able to inquire into that witness’s
untruthful act under Rule 608(b).17 Likewise, if the proponent could not
introduce an item of evidence as an official record over a hearsay objection
under Rule 803(8),18 the proponent might be able to persuade a judge to
admit the item as a business entry under Rule 803(6).19 Similarly, although
the proponent might be unable to find a lay acquaintance to authenticate a
writing under Rule 901(b)(2),20 the proponent could call a forensic
examiner to authenticate the document under Rule 901(b)(3).21 At first
blush, each provision seems to be a stand-alone doctrine, and the provisions
appear capable of serving as alternative theories of admissibility.
In a few cases, though, some courts have refused to treat the provisions
as independent. As Part I demonstrates, all of these cases deal with a
10. Id. 703 (any fact personally observed or brought to the expert’s attention if it is the
reasonable practice in the expert’s field to rely on reports from such sources).
11. Id. 801(d) (exemptions for a party-opponent’s statements and a testifying witness’s
prior statements); id. 803 (exceptions that do not require proof of the declarant’s
unavailability at trial); id. 804 (exceptions that require proof of the declarant’s unavailability
at trial); id. 807 (the residual or catchall exception).
12. Id. 901(b).
13. Id. 902 (noting that self-authenticating items “require no extrinsic evidence of
authenticity in order to be admitted”).
14. Id. 1004–07.
15. See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 66 (2d Cir. 1977).
16. FED. R. EVID. 609.
17. Id. 608(b).
18. Id. 803(8).
19. Id. 803(6).
20. Id. 901(b)(2).
21. Id. 901(b)(3).
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variation of the same basic fact situation: The court analyzes two distinct
provisions in the same article of the Federal Rules of Evidence; one
provision expressly imposes a restriction on the introduction of evidence
under that provision; the second provision does not contain that restriction;
and the text of the first provision does not purport to extend the restriction
to the second provision. Yet, in these cases, the court ultimately decides to
apply the restriction stated in the first provision to the second provision and,
on that basis, excludes the proffered evidence.
This Article concedes the importance of context in the process of
statutory construction. As the Supreme Court commented in King v. St.
Vincent’s Hospital, context—the other parts of the same statutory scheme—
can play a central role in statutory interpretation. 22 Yet, this Article argues
that in the fact situation discussed in the preceding paragraph, contextual
interpretation ordinarily does not provide an adequate justification for
“importing” a restriction from one Federal Rule of Evidence provision into
another. In the typical case, such a judicial importation amounts to a
usurpation of legislative authority. More specifically, this Article contends
that the courts may only import a restriction from another provision if the
accompanying extrinsic legislative history very clearly manifests a
legislative intention not merely to impose a restriction under the first
provision but, more importantly, to absolutely bar the admission of a
particular type of evidence under any theory.
The Article develops this thesis in three steps. Part I is descriptive and
reviews three lines of authority in which the courts have imported
restrictions from one Federal Rule provision to another: first, from Rule 609
to Rule 608(b); second, in which the courts have limited the scope of Rule
807 (the residual hearsay exception) in light of express restrictions codified
in Rules 803 and 804; and third, from Rule 803(8) to Rule 803(6). In each
of these cases, courts treated the provision setting out the imported
restrictions as context for the second provision and, for that reason, read the
restriction into the second provision.
Part II presents an overview of the general contemporary framework for
statutory construction. Initially, Section II.A describes the modern textualist
approach to statutory construction, which cautions against routinely
consulting extrinsic legislative history and ascribing significant weight to
such history. The approach emphasizes that only the statutory language has
22. 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (“[T]he meaning of statutory language, plain or not,
depends on context.”) (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 26
(1988)).
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the force of law and that extrinsic legislative history is vulnerable to
manipulation by special interest groups. The ascendance of textualism has
simultaneously decreased the importance of extrinsic legislative history and
increased the importance of context. Like the specific text being construed,
the context—other parts of the same legislative scheme—has the formal
status of law. In some statutory construction texts, contextual interpretation
is perfectly legitimate. For example, the contents of one provision can help
clarify the meaning of an ambiguous word or phrase in another provision.
Furthermore, context can be dispositive of the construction of one provision
if a certain interpretation of that provision would render another provision
nugatory. But context alone does not warrant transferring or importing
restrictions from one provision in a statutory scheme into another. The
bottom line is that the importation is justifiable only if the extrinsic history
contains an extraordinarily strong showing of a certain type of legislative
intent—namely, an intent to insert the restriction into the other provision.
After describing the general textualist approach to statutory construction,
Section II.B proposes adapting that framework to the recurring fact pattern
from Part I—specifically, situations in which the opponent urges the court
to enforce a restriction stated in one provision of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in the course of applying another Federal Rules provision. Part II
illustrates situations in which a court may legitimately import the restriction
into the second provision to either clarify the second provision or prevent
the nullification of the first provision. However, absent such situations,
Section II.B argues that a court may legitimately import a restriction only if
the extrinsic legislative history powerfully manifests an intent to bar
completely the admission of a type of evidence mentioned in the first
provision—not merely to impose a restriction on the admissibility of such
evidence under that provision.
Part III critically evaluates contextual interpretation and revisits the three
lines of authority discussed in Part I. It critiques those lines of authority by
applying the test proposed in Section II.B and concludes that only one is
defensible. The other two lines of authority are flawed—one because the
legislative history does not manifest the right type of intent, and the other
because the extrinsic history is conflicted and falls short of qualifying as an
extraordinarily clear showing of legislative intent.
The Article concludes by cautioning against the indiscriminate use of
contextual interpretation—either as an approach to the construction of the
Federal Rules of Evidence or more broadly. As Judge Calabresi famously
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remarked, we are living in the age of statutes23—an era in which statutes
have supplanted cases as the primary source of American law. To be sure,
context has a useful role to play in the interpretation of comprehensive
statutory schemes. However, importing restrictions from one statutory
provision into another provision—absent an exceptionally powerful
showing of a legislative intent to extend the restriction in the extrinsic
history—amounts to an unconstitutional judicial amendment of the second
provision. As Part II acknowledges, contextual interpretation has numerous,
legitimate applications. But under the Federal Rules of Evidence, context,
more often than not, does not justify importation.
I. A Description of Three Lines of Cases Relying on Contextual
Interpretation to Justify Importing Restrictions from One Provision of the
Federal Rules of Evidence into Another Provision
A. Importing Restrictions Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609 into Rule
608(b)
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 governs the use of a witness’s prior
convictions to impeach that witness’s credibility. 24 Both the title and text of
Rule 609(a) expressly refer to a “conviction.” When the witness’s prior
conviction qualifies as a felony offense under Rule 609(a)(1), or involves “a
dishonest act or false statement” under Rule 609(a)(2), the opposing
attorney may cross-examine the witness about the conviction.25 However, it
is well-settled that when the opponent relies on Rule 609(a) as the method
of impeachment, the scope of the opponent’s inquiry is limited. While the
opponent may question the witness about the fact of the conviction, the
name of the underlying crime, and the sentence,26 the opponent may not
inquire about other damaging details or “facts underlying the prior
conviction.”27 Those details are not “fair game” under Rule 609.28
Compare another impeachment statute. Rule 608(b) allows the crossexaminer to question “specific instances of a witness’s conduct” “if they are
23. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982).
24. FED. R. EVID. 609.
25. Id. 609(a)(1), (2).
26. United States v. Albers, 93 F.3d 1469, 1480 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
DeLeon, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1235 (D.N.M. 2018).
27. Albers, 93 F.3d at 1480.
28. See id. (“However, the defendant was entitled to the protection of the rule that only
the prior conviction, its general nature, and punishment of felony range were fair game for
testing the defendant’s credibility.”).
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probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of . . . the
witness.”29 Note the differences between Rule 609 and Rule 608(b). While
the text of Rule 609 explicitly refers to a “conviction,” that noun does not
appear in Rule 608(b). Moreover, the text of Rule 608(b) neither requires
the opponent to show that the untruthful act has resulted in a conviction nor
indicates whether the opponent may resort to Rule 608(b) when the act in
question has resulted in a conviction. Hence, if courts were to treat the
provisions independently, when a conviction qualifies under Rule 609 but
the underlying act reflects unfavorably on the witness’s character for
untruthfulness, the opponent could presumably do the following: (1) under
Rule 609, question the witness about the fact of a conviction, the name of
the underlying offense, and the sentence; and (2) under Rule 608(b), inquire
further about the specific details that suggest the witness’s character trait or
propensity for untruthfulness.
The rub is that there is a line of cases holding that when the witness has
been convicted for the untruthful act, the applicability of Rule 609
precludes the opponent from also invoking Rule 608(b)30 and questioning
about the details that reflect adversely on the witness’s character for
truthfulness under Rule 609.31 In other words, these courts limit the scope
of Rule 608(b) to “specific instances of [untruthful] conduct not resulting in
conviction . . . .”32 They do so despite the fact that the words, “not resulting
in a conviction,” do not appear in the text of Rule 608(b). These courts have
treated Rule 609 as essential context for construing Rule 608(b), looked to
the restrictions under Rule 609, and (to a degree) imported them into Rule
608(b). Even if the nature of the underlying act would otherwise entitle the
cross-examiner to inquire when the witness has been convicted under Rule
608(b), the Rule 609 restrictions control. According to this line of cases,
Rules 608(b) and 609 do not represent alternative theories of admissibility
that, given the right facts, can both come into play during a witness’s crossexamination. The upshot of this view is that the two rules are considered
mutually exclusive: Rule 609 applies when the witness has been convicted,

29. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
30. DeLeon, 308 F. Supp. 3d at 1235 (“The United States Courts of Appeal disagree
regarding whether introducing evidence of a witness’ criminal conviction under rule 609
precludes rule 608(b) inquiry, on cross examination, regarding the specific instance of
conduct that produced the conviction if that conduct is probative of the witness’ character for
truthfulness.”).
31. See Albers, 93 F.3d at 1480.
32. United States v. Morales-Quinones, 812 F.2d 604, 613 (10th Cir. 1987).
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and Rule 608(b) applies only when the witness’s untruthful act has not
resulted in a conviction.
B. Importing Restrictions from Rules 803 and 804 into Rule 807
When the Federal Rules of Evidence took effect in 1975, two provisions
contained residual or “catchall” hearsay exceptions. Rule 803, which
governs exceptions which do not require a showing of the declarant’s
availability at trial, concluded with a residual exception.33 Likewise, Rule
804, which governs exceptions that require a showing of the declarant’s
unavailability at trial, also ended with a residual exception. 34 Eventually,
however, the two exceptions were merged into a single provision, now
designated Rule 807.35 As restyled in 2011, Rule 807(a) reads as follows:
(a) In General. Under the following circumstances, a hearsay
statement is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the
statement is not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in
Rule 803 or 804:
(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness;
(2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through
reasonable efforts; and
(4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and
the interests of justice.36
Although the text of the rule affirmatively requires that the proffered
evidence have “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” that are
“equivalent” to hearsay admitted under Rule 803 or 804, Rule 807 says
nothing about the significance of whether the evidence fails to qualify
under the specific hearsay exceptions found in Rules 803 or 804.37 Despite
this silence, a number of courts have adopted the so-called “near miss”

33. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s notes to 1974 enactment (“[T]he committee
has adopted residual exceptions for rules 803 and 804(b) . . . .”).
34. Id.
35. FED. R. EVID. 807.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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doctrine.38 According to this doctrine, if an item of evidence “almost” 39 or
“nearly”40 fit into a specific Rule 803 or 804 exception but “narrowly
fail[ed]”41 to satisfy that exception’s restrictions, the item was automatically
inadmissible. To a degree, the “near miss” doctrine read the restrictions of
the pertinent Rule 803 or 804 exception into Rule 807.
The courts that adopted this view cited two reasons for embracing the
doctrine. First, if the courts did apply the “near miss” doctrine, it would be
too easy for proponents to circumvent the specific restrictions that the

38. See, e.g., United States v. Vigoa, 656 F. Supp. 1499, 1504 (D.N.J. 1987), aff’d, 857
F.2d 1467 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[N]either the Advisory Committee nor the Senate Judiciary
Committee intended that the residual exceptions be used to qualify for admission evidence
which is of a type covered by a specific exception, but which narrowly fails to meet the
standards of the specific rule.”) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
505 F. Supp. 1190, 1263–64 (E.D. Pa. 1980)); see also Creamer v. Gen. Teamsters Local
Union 326, 560 F. Supp. 495, 498 (D. Del. 1983) (“[W]here there is a specific hearsay
exception applicable to a clearly defined category of evidence such as former testimony, but
the evidence fails to satisfy the requirements of the specific exception, the evidence should
not be admitted under the residual exception.”) (citing Zenith Radio, 505 F. Supp. at 1263–
64).
The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the new amendment to Federal Rule of
Evidence 807 mentions that some courts have “consider[ed] whether the statement is a ‘near
miss’ of one of the Rule 803 or 804 exceptions.” FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee’s
notes to 2019 amendment. As amended, Rule 807 no longer includes a reference to
“equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” Rather, amended Rule 807
instructs the judge to determine whether “the statement is supported by sufficient guarantees
of trustworthiness.” FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(1) (effective Dec. 1, 2019). The Report of the
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, submitted to the Supreme Court, states:
[T]he Committee addressed a dispute in the courts about whether the residual
exception could be used when the hearsay is a “near-miss” of a standard
exception. A change to the text and Committee Note as issued for public
comment provides that a statement that nearly misses a standard exception can
be admissible under Rule 807 so long as the court finds that there are sufficient
guarantees of trustworthiness.
Memorandum from the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules to the Comm. on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (May 14, 2018), in Judicial Conference Comm. on Rules of Practice
& Procedure, June 2018 Meeting Materials 397, 400 (June 12, 2018),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ev_report_1.pdf. The Report thus makes it clear
that it is not fatal to the admissibility of a statement that it is a “near-miss” to an enumerated,
standard exception.
39. 7 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 807.1, at 831–36 (7th
ed. 2012).
40. 5 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:141,
at 281 (3d ed. 2007).
41. GRAHAM, supra note 39, at 831–36.
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drafters had included in the Rule 803 and 804 exceptions.42 Second, the
courts stressed the fact that at several junctures in the congressional
deliberations over the residual exceptions, legislators feared that the
residual exception would confer excessive discretion on trial judges and
hoped that courts would use the exception sparingly in rare, extraordinary
circumstances.43 Rather than conducting the overall assessment of
circumstantial trustworthiness mandated by Rule 807(a)(1), these courts
imported into Rule 807 the specific restrictions in the Rule 803 or 804
exception most analogous to the fact situation. As a result, if the
proponent’s foundation falls just short of satisfying those restrictions,
exclusion under Rule 807 is mandatory.
C. Importing Restrictions from Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) into Rule
803(6)
Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 803(8) both fall under Rule 803,
which is the overall provision listing hearsay exceptions that do not require
a foundational showing of the declarant’s unavailability at the time of
trial.44 Specifically, Rule 803(6) codifies the business entry exception. As
restyled in 2011, the rule explicitly requires proof of the following
foundational facts:
$

“[T]he record was made at or near the time” of the recorded
event;

$

The ultimate source of the information in the record was an
individual with personal knowledge;

$

“[T]he record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted
activity of a business;” and

42. Id. at 837; see United States v. Dent, 984 F.2d 1453, 1467 (7th Cir. 1993)
(Easterbrook, J. & Bauer, C.J., concurring) (“Temptation to get ‘round this limitation by
moving to Rule 804(b)(5) . . . should be resisted.”); Latson v. Clarke, 346 F. Supp. 3d 831,
857 (W.D. Va. 2018) (noting that a liberal interpretation of the residual exception “would
easily cause the exception to swallow the rule”) (quoting United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d
385, 394 (4th Cir. 1998)).
43. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Scope of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 239, 247–52 (1978) (reviewing the
congressional deliberations over the proposed residual exceptions) [hereinafter
Imwinkelried, Scope of the Residual Hearsay]; see Latson, 346 F. Supp. 3d at 856–57 (“The
residual exception ‘is a narrow exception that should not be construed broadly’ . . . .”)
(quoting Dunford, 148 F.3d at 394).
44. FED. R. EVID. 803(6), (8).
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$

It was the “regular practice of that activity” to prepare that type
of record.45

The definition of “regularly conducted activity” in a Rule 803(6)(B)
“business, organization, occupation, or calling,”46 is expansive enough to
include a government organization. The rule does not contain any language
barring the use of an otherwise admissible business entry in criminal cases.
On its face, restyled Rule 803(8) applies to government organizations. 47
Rule 803(8)(A)(i) authorizes the receipt of records that reflect “the office’s
[own] activities,” such as office transactions. 48 With one exception, Rule
803(8)(A)(ii) permits the admission of records documenting “a matter
observed while under a legal duty to report,” even if the observation occurs
outside the office.49 Such evidence is admissible unless it concerns “a
matter observed by law-enforcement personnel” during a criminal case. 50
Similarly, Rule 803(8)(A)(iii) allows the introduction of records stating
“factual findings from a legally authorized investigation.” 51 However, Rule
803(8)(A)(iii) permits the admission of factual findings in all civil cases “or
against the government in a criminal case.”52 In other words, the exception
provides that otherwise admissible factual findings are inadmissible against
the criminally accused.
Like Rules 608 and 609, Rules 803(6) and 803(8) appear to be
independent provisions, thus raising the possibility that a proponent may
invoke Rule 803(6) even when Rule 803(8) is inapplicable. Yet, the Second
Circuit opened a contrary line of authority when it held otherwise in its
1977 decision, United States v. Oates.53 In Oates, a drug prosecution case,
the prosecution offered a report and worksheet prepared by a United States
Customs Service chemist at trial.54 The report stated that the powder seized
from the defendant was heroin.55 The prosecution proffered the report on
two theories.56
45. Id. 803(6).
46. Id. 803(6)(B).
47. Id. 803(8).
48. Id. 803(8)(A)(i).
49. Id. 803(8)(A)(ii). On its face, the provision is not limited to matters observed on the
office’s premises.
50. Id.
51. Id. 803(8)(A)(iii).
52. Id.
53. 560 F.2d 45, 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
54. Id. at 63–64.
55. Id. at 63.
56. See id. at 64–66.
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The first theory was that the report qualified as an official record under
Rule 803(8), but the court rejected that theory on two grounds.57 First, the
court stated that the conclusions in the report were clearly “factual findings
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law.”58 Consequently, the conclusions were excluded under then-existing
Rule 803(8)(C),59 which corresponds to the current Rule 803(8)(A)(iii). 60
Second, the court ruled that the report’s conclusions were also inadmissible
under then-existing Rule 803(8)(B),61 which corresponds to the current
Rule 803(8)(A)(ii).62 The court reasoned that the report fell within Rule
803(8)(B)’s exception for “matters observed by police officers and other
law enforcement personnel.”63 In the court’s view, the Customs Service
agents were “law enforcement personnel” under the statute. 64 The court
stated it had to “read [the exception] broadly enough to make its
prohibitions against the use of government-generated reports in criminal
cases coterminous with the analogous prohibitions contained in FRE
803(8)(C).”65
The prosecution’s second theory was that the chemists’ report constituted
an admissible business entry under Rule 803(6).66 Rule 803(6) did not
contain either of the express exceptions set out in Rule 803(8); nevertheless,
the court stated that it must bar the report under Rule 803(6) as well.67 The
court asserted that “there [was] a clear congressional intent that such
documents be inadmissible against a” criminal defendant, despite the fact
“that the chemist’s documents might appear to be within the literal
57. Id. at 66–68.
58. Id. at 67.
59. Id.
60. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
61. Oates, 560 F.2d at 67 (“Though with less confidence, we believe that the chemist’s
documents might also fail to achieve status as public records under FRE 803(8)(B) because
they are records of ‘matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement
personnel.’”).
62. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
63. Oates, 560 F.2d at 67.
64. Id. at 68 (construing the language “to include, at the least, any officer or employee
of a governmental agency which has law enforcement responsibilities”).
65. Id. at 67–68 (citing United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 968–69 n.24 (D.C. Cir.
1975)).
66. Id. at 66; see also id. at 74–80.
67. Id. at 68 (“Our conclusion that the chemist’s report and worksheet do not satisfy the
standards of FRE 803(8) comports perfectly with what we discern to be clear legislative
intent not only to exclude such documents from the scope of FRE 803(8) but from the scope
of FRE 803(6) as well.”).
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language of FRE 803(6).”68 The court read the extrinsic legislative history,
and found the drafters had manifested a firm intention in the legislative
history of Rule 803(8)69 to render such reports absolutely inadmissible
under any theory: “The result Congress intended was the absolute
inadmissibility of records of this nature . . . .” 70
The court pointed to passages in both the Advisory Committee Note
accompanying Rule 803(8) and passages in the congressional deliberations
over the rules. The court quoted the Advisory Committee’s statement that
the exceptions stated in Rule 803(8) were needed because of the “almost
certain collision with [Sixth Amendment] confrontation rights which would
result from [the] use [of such reports] against an accused in a criminal
case.”71 The court then noted passages in the House and Conference
Committee proceedings in which legislators who played prominent roles in
proposing the 803(8) exceptions voiced a wide concern on confrontation
clause grounds,72 which would be equally applicable whether the court
admitted the record as an official record or business entry. The court
reasoned that the legislative history dictated a ruling that if the conclusions
in a government document constituted inadmissible findings under thenexisting Rule 803(8)(C) (the current Rule 803(8)(A)(iii)), the document had
to be “similarly disqualified under any exception to the hearsay rule.” 73 The
court frankly acknowledged that it was reading the Rule 803(8)(C)
restriction into Rule 803(6).74

68. Id. at 75.
69. See id. at 79 (“We thus consider it clear that Congress has expressed a firm intention
that, if there are plausible doubts that evidence fitting within the literal terms of a hearsay
exception could survive confrontation analysis, the hearsay exception should be construed
with considerable flexibility so that the court can, if possible, avoid deciding the
constitutional question.”).
70. Id. at 69; see also id. at 72, 77. See also Jeffrey Bellin & Shevarma Pemberton,
Policing the Admissibility of Body Camera Evidence, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1425, 1446
(2019) (referring to “the so-called ‘law enforcement’ exception to the public records hearsay
exception”).
71. Oates, 560 F.2d at 79 (quoting Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 313 (1972)).
72. See id. at 69–73.
73. Id. at 72.
74. Id. at 78 (“Even if the remarks of Representatives Hungate and Dennis were not as
clear as they are, we could still reach the same conclusion that, in view of the articulated
purpose behind the narrow drafting of FRE 803 in general and FRE 803(8) in particular,
FRE 803(6) must be read in conjunction with FRE 803(8)(B) and (C).”).
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II. The Modern Textualist Approach to Statutory Construction: The Role of
Context and Extrinsic Legislative History in General and in the Specific
Setting of the Federal Rules of Evidence
It is true that there have been and, in some jurisdictions, still are,
approaches to statutory construction other than textualism. For a long
period in modern American legal history, the prevailing view was the legal
process school of thought.75 That approach presumed that legislators act in
good faith and in pursuit of the public good.76 Given that benign
presumption, courts routinely attached great weight to extrinsic legislative
history material; if legislators almost always act in bona fides, the
legislative history materials they generate ought to be just as reliable as the
statutory text they vote on. As a result, during this period, courts often
based interpretive decisions on legislative history and disregarded the
apparent plain meaning of the statutory text.77
However, law and economics scholars and political scientists sharply
criticized this approach as idealistic78 to the point of being unrealistic. 79
Their analyses and research demonstrated that, in many cases, legislation
represents an amoral deal between particular reelection-minded legislators80
and special interest groups.81 That insight led to the emergence of
textualism, the now dominant approach, especially in federal court—which
has led to a rethinking of the wisdom of relying on extrinsic legislative
history material.82 It is undeniable that textualism has its critics. 83 However,
75. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond “Top Down” Grand Theories of Statutory
Construction: A “Bottom Up” Interpretive Approach to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 75
OR. L. REV. 389, 399–400 (1996) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond].
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 628
(1990) (noting that “strongly contradictory legislative history can trump plain meaning”).
78. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION : STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 609 (1988).
79. See id. at 572.
80. Id. at 333–34.
81. See id. at 710 (discussing lobbyists attempt to modify language of legislative
reports).
82. See Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond, supra note 75, at 400–04; see also infra note 84.
83. See generally Joseph Kimble, Ideological Judging: The Record of Textualism,
NAT’L L.J., Aug. 2018, at 79; Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73
WASH. U.L.Q. 1057 (1995); Andrew E. Taslitz, Daubert’s Guide to the Federal Rules of
Evidence: A Not-So-Plain-Meaning Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. J. LEGIS. 3 (1995); Glen
Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307 (1992).
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a review of the Statutes headnotes in any recent Federal Reporter or Federal
Supplement advance sheet will readily demonstrate that, today, federal
judges overwhelmingly apply a textualist approach to legisprudential
issues.84 Although one of the Court’s more conservative jurists, Justice
Scalia, was one of the early advocates of textualism, one of the more liberal
jurists, Justice Kagan, has remarked, “We’re all textualists now.” 85 For that
reason, because of the emergence and continued foreseeable dominance of
textualism, this article looks to evaluate the three lines of federal authority
discussed in Part I through a textualist lens.
A. Textualism in General
1. The Decline in the Importance of Extrinsic Legislative History
As previously stated, this is the Age of Statutes. 86 Increasingly, legal
disputes are resolved by an interaction between the judicial and legislative
branches—namely, a judge’s interpretation of a rule crafted by a legislature,
rather than a rule formulated by a court. The increased frequency of such
interactions intensifies the focus on the constitutional doctrine of separation
84. For example, the most recent federal court advance sheets indicate a number of
opinions stating textualist views. See, e.g., Reed v. Taylor, 923 F.3d 411, 415–16 (5th Cir.
2019); Warner v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 931 F.3d 917, 921 (9th Cir. 2019). The same
pattern is evident in the most recent federal supplement advance sheets. Paczkowski v. My
Choice Family Care, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 3d 991, 993 (W.D. Wis. 2019); Dorbor v. United
States, 379 F. Supp. 3d 765, 768–69 (W.D. Wis. 2019); Urbain Pottier v. Hotel Plaza Las
Delicias, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 3d 130, 134 (D.P.R. 2019).
One is hard pressed to find any reference to the older legal process approach to statutory
construction. See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence
After Sixteen Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the Need for an
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the
Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 867 (1992) (noting an increase in “scholarly
attention . . . to theories of statutory interpretation, particularly in light of the Court’s recent
trend toward plain meaning”); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense of the
Supreme Court’s Approach to the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 27 IND. L.
REV. 267, 268 (1993) (“In adopting the moderate textualist approach, most of the current
Justices have rejected the traditional, legal process approach to statutory construction.”);
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of
Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REV. 745, 745 (1990) (“The Supreme Court has imposed the plainmeaning standard of statutory interpretation on the Federal Rules of Evidence.”). See
generally Eskridge, supra note 77; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation
Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691 (1987).
85. Bryan A. Garner, It Means What It Says, ABA J., Apr. 2019, at 28, 28 (quoting
Justice Elena Kagan).
86. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 23.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

246

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:231

of powers.87 In part, that focus may well have contributed to the emergence
of the modern textualist approach to statutory construction.
Simply stated, the touchstone of the textualist approach is the primacy of
the text—the language of the statute being interpreted.88 As a formal matter,
unlike extrinsic legislative history, such as committee reports and testimony
at congressional hearings, the text of the statute has the force of law; the
statutory language is the law.89 Legislators vote on and approve the text of a
statute,90 not their personal thoughts about the statute.91 As Justice Jackson
urged almost seventy years ago, the judge performing the interpretive task
should conduct an “analysis of the statute instead of by psychoanalysis of
Congress.”92 Admittedly, extrinsic legislative history can sometimes help

87. United States v. All Funds on Deposit in United Bank, 188 F. Supp. 2d 407, 411
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The language . . . is plain on its face; and where that is so, then not only is
there no need to resort to legislative history, but also, under the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers, it is inappropriate to do so.”); see Jim Chen, Law as a Species of
Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U.L.Q. 1263, 1296–98 (1995); Mark I. Schwartz,
Conquering Separation Anxiety, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 7, 1995, at 26.
88. United States v. Maturino, 887 F.3d 716, 723 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Text is the alpha and
the omega of the interpretive process.”); Chen, supra note 87, at 1302 (“[T]he textualist
recipe puts statutory language at the head of its interpretive sentences.”).
89. Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 174 F. Supp. 3d 242, 261 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Statutes are
law . . . .”) (quoting In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989)); Ariz. Contractors
Ass’n v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1046 (D. Ariz. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Chicanos
Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The language of the
statute . . . controls.”) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546,
568 (2005); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 150 n.4 (2002);
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62–63 (2002)); see also Sterk v. Redbox
Automated Retail, LLC, 806 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1068 (N.D. Ill. 2011), rev’d, 672 F.3d 535
(7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he authoritative statement is the statutory text . . . .”) (citing Exxon
Mobil, 545 U.S. at 568); United States v. Cochran, 640 F. Supp. 2d 934, 937 (N.D. Ohio
2009) (noting that the text is an “authoritative statement”) (citing Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at
568); United States v. Smith, 593 F. Supp. 2d 948, 954 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (“[T]he authoritative
statement is the statutory text.”) (quoting City of Cookeville v. Upper Cumberland Elec.
Membership Corp., 484 F.3d 380, 390 n.6 (6th Cir. 2007)).
90. Kaufman v. Holder, 686 F. Supp. 2d 40, 43 (D.D.C. 2010); People v. Hunt, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 524, 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (“[I]t is the language of the statute itself that has
successfully braved the legislative gauntlet.”) (quoting Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky
Stores, Inc., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 298, 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)).
91. See United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Legislation is an
objective text approved in constitutionally prescribed ways; its scope is not limited by the
celebrations of those who voted for or signed it into law.”).
92. United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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one construe the language, but only the statute has the status of law. 93 In
light of the doctrine of separation of powers,94 courts have a formal,
constitutional obligation to respect the linguistic choices made by the
legislature95 because those words are the best reflection of the legislature’s
policy choices embedded in the statute.
The case for textualism, though, rests on more than formalism. Since
World War II, political science research has exposed the extent to which
special interest groups can influence—and manipulate—the process which
generates legislative history materials such as committee reports.96 The
Supreme Court has even recognized that practical danger and cautioned
against uncritical reliance on extrinsic legislative history material. 97
Given these formal and practical considerations, two schools of
textualism have developed. The more extreme school takes the position that
if a judge reviews the text and context of a statute and concludes that the
language has a plain meaning, the judge’s interpretive analysis is
complete98 and ceases.99 In that event, the judge treats the plain meaning as
93. Hunt, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 528 (“Not even the most reliable document of legislative
history has the force of law.”) (citing City of Sacramento v. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 545, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)).
94. United States v. All Funds on Deposit in United Bank, 188 F. Supp. 2d 407, 411
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
95. Russell v. Choicepoint Servs, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 654, 664 (E.D. La. 2004);
Oyuela v. Seacor Marine (Nigeria), Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 713, 724 (E.D. La. 2003), aff’d,
201 F. App’x 269 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
96. Lujan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 69 F.3d 1511, 1518 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Statutes
may have multiple purposes and may represent a compromise between competing
considerations.”) (citations omitted); In re Vizio, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litig., 238 F.
Supp. 3d 1204, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (noting there are “pitfalls that plague too quick a turn
to the more controversial realm of legislative history”) (quoting Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S.
526, 526 (2004)); United States v. Smith, 593 F. Supp. 2d 948, 954 (E.D. Ky. 2009)
(explaining that legislative history has “limited utility and reliability”) (quoting City of
Cookeville v. Upper Cumberland Elec. Membership Corp., 484 F.3d 380, 390 n.6 (6th Cir.
2007)); see also Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of
Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1717, 1744 (1995); Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and
the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call for a Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 329, 356–57 (1995) (discussing Arrow’s Paradox).
97. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568–70 (2005).
98. United States v. One 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser, 248 F.3d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“When the words of a statute are unambiguous, . . . this first canon is also the last: judicial
inquiry is complete.”) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992));
Rodriguez v. Carson, 377 F. Supp. 3d 401, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“When the words of a
statutes are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.”)
(quoting Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 189 (2d Cir. 2013)).
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99. United States v. Ng Lap Seng, 934 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2019); Beevan & Assocs.,
LPA, Inc. v. Yost, 929 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Where ‘the meaning of a statute is
unambiguous and definite, it must be applied as written and no further interpretation is
necessary.’”) (quoting State ex rel. Prade v. Ninth Dist. Court of Appeals, 2017-Ohio-7651,
¶ 14, 87 N.E.3d 1239, 1242); Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 926 F.3d 235, 260
(6th Cir. 2019) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.”) (quoting
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)); Warner v. Experian Info. Sols.,
Inc., 931 F.3d 917, 921 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Thus, our inquiry begins . . . , and ends . . . if the
statutory text is unambiguous.”) (quoting Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d
946, 951 (9th Cir. 2009)); Wadler v. Bio-Rad Labs., Inc., 916 F.3d 1176, 1187 (9th Cir.
2019) (“When . . . ‘a statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, our inquiry ends.’”)
(quoting Christie v. Ga.-Pac. Co., 898 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2018)); Sucic v. Wilkie, 921
F.3d 1095, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Our inquiry ceases ‘if the statutory language is
unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’”) (quoting Barnhart v.
Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)); Hall v. United States, 677 F.3d 1340, 1346
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank, 677 F.3d at 254); see, e.g., Paczkowski v. My
Choice Family Care, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 3d 991, 993 (W.D. Wis. 2019) (“‘Statutory
interpretation begins with—and, absent ambiguity, is confined to—the language of the
statute’ . . . .”) (quoting Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 2001 WI 81, ¶ 10, 244
Wis.2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833); Urbain Pottier v. Hotel Plaza Las Delicias, Inc., 379 F. Supp.
3d 130, 134 (D.P.R. 2019) (“Statutory construction in Puerto Rico begins with the text of the
underlying statute, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.”) (quoting OquendoLorenzo v. Hosp. San Antonio, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 3d 103, 107 (D.P.R. 2017)); Thompson v.
Does 1-5, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2019) (“A determination of what the
[statute] requires ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is
unambiguous.’”) (quoting BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)); Town
of Dutch John v. Daggett Cty., 367 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1297 (D. Utah 2019) (“‘[I]f the
statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,’ the
court's inquiry ends there.”) (quoting Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 450); Glob. Tropical Imps. &
Exps. LLC v. Bernhardt, 366 F. Supp. 3d 110, 115 (D.D.C. 2019) (“The Court's inquiry
‘begins with the statutory text’ and ‘ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.’”)
(quoting BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 183); United States v. Patara, 365 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1088
(S.D. Cal. 2019) (“Thus, our inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if
the text is unambiguous.”) (quoting Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 951); League of Conservative
Voters v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (D. Alaska 2019) (“Judicial ‘inquiry begins with the
statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.’”) (quoting BedRoc, 541
U.S. at 183); Tugaw Ranches, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 362 F. Supp. 3d 879, 881 (D.
Idaho 2019) (“Where the statutory language is unambiguous, the court's inquiry is at an
end.”) (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 631 (2018); Wade v.
Burns, 361 F. Supp. 3d 306, 310 (D. Conn. 2019) (“Our inquiry must cease if the statutory
language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.”) (quoting
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)); Jax Leasing, LLC v. Xiulu Ruan, 359
F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1137 (S.D. Ala. 2019) (“Although the rule is not always honored, ‘our
inquiry into the meaning of [a] statute's text ceases when the statutory language is
unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’”) (quoting Matal v. Tam,
137 S. Ct. 1744, 1756 (2017)).
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conclusive of the statute’s interpretation.100 Unless the judge finds that the
statutory language is ambiguous 101 and lacks a plain meaning, the judge
need not (and should not) even consider extrinsic legislative history
material,102 which might suggest a contrary meaning.103 Finding that the
statutory text lacks a plain meaning is a condition precedent to resorting to
extrinsic material; and if the judge finds a plain meaning, the judge may not
turn to extrinsic material—no matter how favorably the material points to a
different interpretation.104
Although the strict textualist school has adherents, a more moderate
version of textualism enjoys greater popularity among the courts. Moderate
textualists believe that a judge may at least consider extrinsic material, even
when the statute superficially105 appears to have a plain meaning. 106
However, moderate textualists respect the primacy of the statutory language

100. Electrolux Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 491 F.3d 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
101. See In re W. Iowa Limestone, Inc., 538 F.3d 858, 863 (8th Cir. 2008) (“A statute . . .
is ambiguous if reasonable minds could differ or be uncertain as to the meaning of the
statute.”) (quoting City of Waterloo v. Bainbridge, 749 N.W.2d 245, 248 (Iowa 2008));
Carter Tr. ex rel. Forston v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 2d 536, 540 (N.D. Tex. 2003)
(starting analysis with the interpretation of the statutory language).
102. In re Larson, 513 F.3d 325, 329 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[L]egislative history does not
trump unambiguous statutory text.”) (citing Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004));
Galloway v. United States, 492 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that when “the
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, [the court] will not create an ambiguity
through the use of legislative history”); United States v. Trainor, 376 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th
Cir. 2004); Toyota Land Cruiser, 248 F.3d at 903 (“If the statute’s meaning is clear, we will
not consider legislative history.”).
103. See, e.g., United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 2006) (reviewing
Congress’s construction of a statute to determine the meaning of the language and finding
ambiguity in the history contradicted the plain meaning).
104. In re Universal Seismic Assocs., Inc., 288 F.3d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 2002) (“This
Circuit has also noted that when a plain reading of a statute precludes one party’s
interpretation, ‘no legislative history—be it ever so favorable—can redeem it.’”) (quoting
Nalle v. Comm’r, 997 F.2d 1134, 1140 (5th Cir. 1993)).
105. United States Telecom Ass’n v. FBI, 276 F.3d 620, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Of
course, legislative history may ‘shed new light on congressional intent, notwithstanding
statutory language that appears superficially clear.’”) (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council v.
Browner, 57 F.3d 1122, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
106. APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Techs., 476 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 2007)
(explaining that the court may look beyond plain text to ensure the statute’s purpose is
fulfilled); Cal. Sch. Emps. Ass’n v. Governing Bd. S. Orange Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 21 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 451, 459 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“[I]n rare cases, statutory ambiguity is not a
condition precedent to further interpretation, and the literal meaning of the words may be
disregarded to avoid absurd results.”).
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by recognizing a strong,107 albeit rebuttable,108 presumption in favor of the
apparent plain meaning. Although this school of thought permits the judge
to consider extrinsic material, it still sets a high bar109 and imposes an
onerous burden on the party urging the court to reject the plain meaning
interpretation.110 Given the practical risks of relying on extrinsic material,
the judge must proceed cautiously111 because appellate courts have
cautioned trial judges that the cases in which legislative history trumps

107. Tyler v. Douglas, 280 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Greene v. United
States, 79 F.3d 1348, 1355 (2d Cir. 1996)); United States v. Koh, 199 F.3d 632, 637 (2d Cir.
1999) (“The ‘strong presumption that the plain language of the statute expresses
congressional intent’ can only be rebutted ‘when a contrary legislative intent is clearly
expressed.’”) (quoting Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135–36 (1991)); United States v.
Mack, 164 F.3d 467, 471–72 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 135); United
States v. Wallace, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1132 (D. Ariz. 2007) (citing Ardestani, 502 U.S. at
135); In re Worldcom, Inc. Secs. Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 236, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding
that a clear, contrary legislative intent can rebut the strong presumption in favor of the
statutory text) (citing Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 110 (2d Cir.
2001)).
108. United States v. Bloch, 762 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119–20 (D.D.C.), rev’d on other
grounds, 800 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding the rebuttable presumption exists
when proponent can show “Congress did not mean what is appears to have said, or that, as a
matter of logic and statutory structure, it almost surely could not have meant it”) (internal
citation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterp., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242
(1989)); Lingenfelter v. Cty. of Fresno, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 378, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“The
presumption . . . is not conclusive.”).
109. Forte v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 763 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, 780 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2015) (“The ‘bar for reworking the words our Legislature
passed into law is high.’”) (quoting Combs v. Health Care Servs. Corp., 401 S.W.3d 623,
630 (Tex. 2013)); Consumer Elecs. Ass’n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 298 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(noting “the bar is high”) (quoting Williams Cos. v. FERC, 345 F.3d 910, 914 (D.D.C.
2003)).
110. See, e.g., Bloch, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 120 (finding that proponent did not show any
contrary intent).
111. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95–96 (1985) (“Going behind the plain
language of a statute in search of a possibly contrary congressional intent is a step to be
taken cautiously even under the best circumstances.”) (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v.
Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 75 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v.
Phillips, 543 F.3d 1197, 1207 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Going behind the plain language of a
statute in search of a possibly contrary congressional intent is a step to be taken
cautiously . . . .”) (quoting Locke, 471 U.S. at 95–96); Violette v. P.A. Days, Inc., 427 F.3d
1015, 1017 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Am. Tobacco, 456 U.S. at 75); Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 286 F.3d 803, 805 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[E]ven in
its secondary role legislative history must be used cautiously.”) (quoting Aviall Servs., Inc.
v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134, 140–41 (5th Cir. 2001)).
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statutory text should be few112 and rare.113 There is a wealth of authority
that has held that judges should find the presumption is rebutted only in
exceptional cases114 where the party opposing the plain meaning
interpretation can make a compelling,115 overwhelming,116 or
extraordinarily117 powerful showing that the statute’s seemingly plain
meaning is at odds with the legislative intent.118
112. U.S. Fleet Servs., Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 141 F. Supp. 2d 631, 640 (N.D. Tex.
2001).
113. United States v. Tobeler, 311 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Middle
Mountain Land & Produce, Inc. v. Sound Commodities Inc., 307 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir.
2002)); Hillman v. IRS, 263 F.3d 338, 342 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[E]xceptions to the Plain
Meaning Rule . . . ‘are, and should be, exceptionally rare.’”) (quoting Sigmon Coal Co. v.
Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 304 (4th Cir. 2000)); Minnesota ex rel. Hatch v. Fleet Mortg. Corp.,
181 F. Supp. 2d 995, 999 (D. Minn. 2001) (“Upon a finding that the statutory terms are
unambiguous, further judicial inquiry is only called for in rare and exceptional
circumstances . . . .”) (citing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991)); United
States v. Siart, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1173 (D. Or. 2001) (“This presumption is ‘rebutted
only in rare and exceptional circumstances, when a contrary legislative intent is clearly
expressed.’”) (quoting Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135–36 (1991)).
114. See Martinez v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1327–28
(M.D. Fla. 2009) (“If, after doing so, the meaning of the text is clear, in all but highly
exceptional cases the analysis is complete and goes no further.”) (citing Garcia v. United
States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984)).
115. Joseph v. J.J. MacIntyre Cos., LLC, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(“In some situations, however, what would otherwise appear to be plain language is
interpreted contrarily where there are compelling indications of legislative intent.”) (citing
Cty. of L.A. v. Frisbie, 122 P.2d 526 (Cal. 1942)).
116. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. v. Murphy Bros. Inc., 125 F.3d 1396, 1398 (11th Cir.
1997), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Murphy Bros. Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.
526 U.S. 344 (1999) (“It is true that ‘[i]n rare and exceptional circumstances, we may
decline to follow the plain meaning of a statute because overwhelming extrinsic evidence
demonstrates a legislative intent contrary to the text’s plain meaning.’”) (quoting Boca Ciega
Hotel, Inc. v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 51 F.3d 235, 238 (11th Cir. 1995)).
117. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57 (1997) (“[O]nly the most extraordinary
showing of contrary intentions in the legislative history will justify a departure from that
language.”) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); FTC v. Shire Viropharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 2019)
(“When the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the
disposition required by the [text] is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”)
(quoting Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 302 (3d Cir. 2011));
Murphy, 650 F.3d at 302 (same) (quoting In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.39 298, 314
(3d Cir. 2010)); Standiferd v. U.S. Tr., 641 F.3d 1209, 1213–14 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Only the
most extraordinary showing of a contrary legislative intent can justify our departure from the
plain meaning of the statutory language.”) (citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75
(1984)); United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Absent ambiguity in the
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2. The Increased Importance of Context and Its Legitimate Uses
Context has always played an important role in statutory construction.
However, that observation is even truer today; at the same time that
textualism has depreciated extrinsic legislative history, textualism has also
enhanced the importance of context. Like statutory text—and unlike
extrinsic material—context has the force of law because it is found in other
parts of the same statutory scheme. Moreover, while special interest groups
may exert manipulative influence over committee material behind the
scenes and out of the public view, like the text that must be interpreted, the
context must be voted on publicly.
The maxim noscitur a sociis reflects the traditionally understood
importance of context:119 it “should be determined by words immediately
surrounding it”120 or “a word is known by the company it keeps.” 121 The
basic tenet of “whole act”122 or contextual interpretation is that the
statutory text, ‘[o]nly the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions in the legislative
history will justify a departure from [the statutory] language.’”) (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S.
at 680); United States v. Sabri, 326 F.3d 937, 943 (8th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 541 U.S. 600 (2004)
(same) (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. at 680); Perrone v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 232
F.3d 433, 435 (5th Cir. 2000) (“In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be
the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue, judicial inquiry
into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished.”)
(quoting Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling, Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992)); New York v.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 263 F. Supp. 2d 650, 659 n.15 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (same)
(citing Garcia, 469 U.S. at 70); United States v. Nipper, 198 F. Supp. 2d 818, 821 (W.D. La.
2002) (same) (citing Garcia, 469 U.S. at 75); S. States Coop. Inc. v. I.S.P. Co., Inc., 198 F.
Supp. 2d 807, 813 (N.D. W. Va. 2002) (“Furthermore, where a statute is unambiguous,
legislative history is ‘instructive only upon “the most extraordinary showing of contrary
intentions.”’”) (quoting Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 283 F.3d 429, 435 (2d Cir. 2002)).
118. See, e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 582 F.3d 156, 169–70
(1st Cir. 2009); In re Palmer, 219 F.3d 580, 584–85 (6th Cir. 2000); Red Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24–26 (D.D.C. 2009).
119. See People v. Hernandez, 215 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880, 885 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017)
(describing the term to mean that “a word takes meaning from the company it keeps”)
(quoting People v. Drennan, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584, 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)); Ass’n of
Irritated Residents v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 85 Cal. Rptr.
3d 590, 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he meaning of a word may be enlarged or restrained
by reference to the intent of the whole clause in which it is used.”) (citing People v. Stout, 95
Cal. Rptr. 593, 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)).
120. Noscitur a sociis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
121. SBC Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 506 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).
122. See United States v. Salim, 287 F. Supp. 2d 250, 335–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(discussing the Whole Act rule).
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interpretation of statutory text is a holistic endeavor.123 The text should not
be viewed atomistically,124 in isolation,125 or in a vacuum.126 Rather, the text
123. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988) (“Statutory construction, however, is a holistic endeavor.”); R. H. Donnelley
Corp. v. United States, 641 F.3d 70, 76 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e consider all the words
employed and do not review isolated phrases.”) (quoting United States v. Ide, 624 F.3d 666,
668 (4th Cir. 2010)); Vectra Fitness v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“[S]tatutory interpretation is a ‘holistic endeavor’ that requires consideration of a statutory
scheme in its entirety.”) (quoting United Sav. Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 371); Trs. of the Chi. Truck
Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union (Ind.) Pension Fund v. Leaseway Transp.
Corp., 76 F.3d 824, 828 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Indeed, statutory interpretation ‘is a holistic
endeavor and, at a minimum, must account for a statute’s full text, language as well as
punctuation, structure, and subject matter.’”) (quoting U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins.
Agents, 508 U.S. 439, 454–56 (1993)); Goodman Mfg., L.P. v. United States, 69 F.3d 505,
510 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified
by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . .”) (quoting United Sav. Ass’n, 484 U.S. at
371); see, e.g., Filush v. Town of Weston, 266 F. Supp. 2d 322, 327, 330 (D. Conn. 2003)
(reading Title II of the ADA “in the context of the overall . . . statutory scheme” led the court
to a different conclusion than the majority of courts).
Over the decades, the courts have found numerous, colorful ways of capturing this
notion. Some of the most distinguished American jurists have virtually waxed poetic about
this notion:
$ Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.) (“A word is not a
crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may
vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in
which it is used.”) (citing Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916)).
$ NLRB v. Federbush Co., Inc., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941) (L. Hand, J.)
(“Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal
existence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but
all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they are
used . . . .”).
124. In re Jacqueline L., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 178, 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (ordered not
published) (“Also, proper textual exegesis requires that a statute be construed as a whole,
rather than in atomistic bits.”).
125. Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 541 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Act[s] of Congress . . .
should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated provisions.”) (quoting Soliman v.
Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276, 282 (4th Cir. 2005)); Mendoza v. Nordstrom, Inc., 393 P.3d 375,
381 (Cal. 2017) (“We do not construe statutory language in isolation . . . .”) (quoting Dep’t
of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 145 P.3d 462,
468 (Cal. 2006)); People v. Dorsey, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498, 501–02 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(“[E]ach sentence must be read not in isolation but in light of the statutory scheme . . . .”)
(quoting Lungren v. Deukmejian, 755 P.2d 299, 304 (Cal. 1988)).
126. Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d 784, 789 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Put simply,
courts must recognize that Congress does not legislate in a vacuum.”) (citing Thinking
Machs. Corp. v. Mellon Fin. Servs. Corp. #1 (In re Thinking Machs.), 67 F.3d 1021, 1025
(1st Cir. 1995)); Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 75 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 742 F.3d 1013
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to be construed should be viewed as part of the entire statutory scheme 127 in
order to ensure its overall rational coherence.128 Hence, in a given case, the
context can be crucial in divining the meaning of the dispositive statutory
text.129
a) The Broad Meaning of “Context”
On one hand, courts construe “context” broadly. Given the breadth of the
notion of “context,” courts may interpret: a word in a statutory sentence in
light of other words in the sentence;130 a sentence in a statute in light of
other sentences in the same clause or subsection of the statute;131 one clause
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Statutory language ‘cannot be construed in a vacuum.’”) (quoting Roberts
v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012)); Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim, 372 F. Supp.
2d 1062, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“At the same time, ‘statutory language cannot be construed
in a vacuum.’”) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)).
127. See United States v. Rigel Ships Agencies, Inc., 432 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir.
2005) (per curiam) (“In any question of statutory interpretation, ‘[w]e do not look at one
word or term in isolation, but instead we look to the entire statutory context.’”) (quoting
United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999)); Vectra Fitness, 162 F.3d
at 1384 (reading a statute in light of case law to determine a section is unambiguous);
Mendoza, 393 P.3d at 381 (“Statutory context also matters.”).
128. Mendoza, 393 P.3d at 381 (“We do not construe statutory language in isolation, but
rather as a thread in the fabric of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part.”) (quoting
Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 145 P.3d at 468; Berkeley Hillside Pres. v. City of
Berkeley, 343 P.3d 834 (Cal. 2015)); Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877, 890
(9th Cir. 2011) (“Our goal in interpreting a statute is to understand the statute as a
symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme . . . .”) (quoting Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Gould,
412 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2005)) (internal citation marks omitted); Ass‘n of Irritated
Residents v. U.S. EPA, 632 F.3d 584, 596 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing step one of Chevron)
(citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)); Greenbaum v. U.S. EPA, 370
F.3d 527, 535–36 (6th Cir. 2004) (“A court must therefore interpret the statute as []
symmetrical and coherent . . . .”) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000)); United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 145 (4th Cir. 1994) (“If
the statutory language is unambiguous, then provided that ‘the statutory scheme is coherent
and consistent,’ our inquiry terminates.”) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,
489 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1989)).
129. See generally, Edward J. Imwinkelried, Using a Contextual Construction to Resolve
the Dispute over the Meaning of the Term “Plan” in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 43 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1005 (1995).
130. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993) (“The meaning of a word that
appears ambiguous if viewed in isolation may become clear when the word is analyzed in
light of the terms that surround it.”).
131. Westwood Apex v. Contreras, 644 F.3d 799, 804 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Given that ‘any’
and ‘all’ are used in relation to one another, they should be read that way and interpreted
consistently with the sentence’s structure.”).
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or subsection in light of other clauses or subsections;132 one major
subdivision or title in a legislative scheme in light of other titles;133 and
even a provision in one code in light of other codes that are deemed in pari
materia134 because they address similar policy considerations. Thus,
contextual interpretation has a long reach.
b) The Uses of “Context”
On the other hand, even contextual interpretation has its limits. The use
of context to interpret ambiguously worded provisions and to define the
scope of provisions can be a beneficial tool for the judiciary. However,
courts can abuse context by importing restrictions from one provision into
another, effecting what amounts to an amendment of the legislated scheme.
(1) Using Wording from One Statutory Provision to Eliminate
Ambiguities in the Wording of Another Provision
The most common use of context is to help eliminate ambiguities in the
wording of related statutes. There is consensus that courts may use the
wording of one statutory provision to clarify135 or illuminate136 the meaning
132. Va. Int’l Terminals, Inc. v. Edwards, 398 F.3d 313, 317 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[U]nder a
longstanding canon of interpretation, adjacent statutory subsections that refer to the same
subject matter . . . must be read in pari materia as if they were a single statue.”) (citing
United States v. Srnsky, 271 F.3d 595, 602 (4th Cir. 2001)); United States v. Broncheau, 759
F. Supp. 2d 682, 688 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (adopting the Virginia International approach to
statutory interpretation); Action All. of Senior Citizens v. Johnson, 607 F. Supp. 2d 33
(D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 607 F.3d 860 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“‘[A] statute is to be reads as a whole,’
especially where construing adjacent subsections with remarkably similar structures.”)
(internal citations omitted) (quoting King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991))
(citing United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007)).
133. Mock v. S.D. Bd. of Regents, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1019 (D.S.D. 2003) (analyzing
Title VI and Title IX interchangeably).
134. Jackson v. Albany Appeal Bureau Unit, 442 F.3d 51, 54 n.2 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Since §
2254 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ‘are generally seen as in pari materia,’ the reasoning of cases in
the context of § 2254 petitions applies equally to § 2255 petitions.”) (quoting Kellogg v.
Strack, 269 F.3d 100, 103 n.3 (2d Cir. 2001)); Asfaw v. Woldberhan, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 323,
332 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“Statutes in one code may be considered with those in another
code.”) (citing Estate of Burden v. Agnew, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 390, 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007));
Poway Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777, 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(“The principle of striving for harmony between disparate parts applies even though the two
provisions are in separate codes.”) (citing O’Brien v. Dudenhoeffer, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826,
829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)).
135. In re Mouzon Enters., Inc., 610 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that
reviewing the whole statutory scheme together may help avoid conflict) (citing Burns v.
Lawther, 53 F.3d 1237, 1241 (11th Cir. 1995)).
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of another statutory provision. The wording of Federal Rule of Evidence
403 provides a salient example:
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.137
This wording poses several interpretive issues. For instance, what is the
meaning of “probative value”? Some early commentators suggested that
when assessing the probative value of an item of evidence under Rule 403,
a judge could consider the credibility of the source.138 However, later courts
relied on contextual interpretation in rejecting that suggestion. 139 Federal
Rule of Evidence 104(b) is part of the context of Rule 403; and Rule 104(b)
makes it clear that when the judge determines issues of conditional
relevance, such as the sufficiency of a lay witness’s personal knowledge 140
or the authenticity of an exhibit,141 the judge must accept the proponent’s
foundational testimony at face value.142 Lay jurors without any legal
training are competent to decide whether a witness has firsthand knowledge
or whether a letter is authentic. But, in order to protect the jury’s power to
make the final decision on conditional relevance issues, the judge cannot
consider the credibility of the evidence; the “judge must accept the
136. United States v. Webber, 536 F.3d 584, 593 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The ‘plain meaning’
of a statute, however, is often illuminated not only by its language but also by its structure.”)
(citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001); Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610,
622 (7th Cir. 1997)).
137. FED. R. EVID. 403.
138. Calvin W. Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other Crimes
Evidence: A Sliding Scale of Proof, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 556, 589 (1984).
139. For example, in Adams v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1089 (S.D. Ind.
1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 231 F.3d 414 (7th Cir. 2000), the court narrowed the
scope of probative value “because to do otherwise would usurp the jury’s function.” That
passage is an implicit invocation of Rule 104(b), since 104(b) safeguards the jury’s function
in determining the weight of the evidence. Likewise, in Blackston v. Rapelje, 780 F.3d 340,
357 (6th Cir. 2015), the court stated that it would be a misapplication of Rule 403 to invoke
that provision to shield the jury from testimony because the trial judge had doubts about the
credibility and reliability of the testimony.
140. FED. R. EVID. 602.
141. Id. 901.
142. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal
Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?,
41 VAND. L. REV. 879, 887 (1988).
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testimony at face value and inquire only whether, if believed,” 143 the
testimony possesses sufficient probative worth to support a permissive
inference that the witness has firsthand knowledge or that the exhibit is
authentic.144 In other words, if the jury elects to believe the testimony, will
it support a rational, permissive inference of personal knowledge or
authenticity? Given that understanding of Rule 104(b), courts have
narrowed their interpretation of “probative value” under Rule 403.145
Because Rule 403 applies to virtually every item of evidence, 146 including a
lay witness’s testimony and physical exhibits, if “probative value”
encompassed the credibility of the source, a judge could do precisely what
Rule 104(b) precludes judges from doing.
Similarly, Rule 403 presents the question of what “unfair prejudice”
means. The Advisory Committee Note accompanying Rule 403 states that
an item of evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it creates a significant risk that
the jury will decide the case on an improper basis. 147 However, that
statement begs the question: What is an improper basis? To at least partially
answer that question, courts use contextual interpretation. Rules 404 and
405 are not merely context for Rule 403; they are immediately adjacent
provisions. Those provisions announce a general rule that while the
prosecution may introduce evidence of a defendant’s uncharged misdeeds
on a noncharacter theory of logical relevance, the prosecution may not
proffer the evidence on the basis of simplistic character reasoning, such as
“He or she did it once, therefore they did it again.” 148 Testimony about a
defendant’s other crimes is always relevant to show the defendant’s bad
character, but what if the evidence is also relevant on a noncharacter theory
143. Id.
144. See CARLSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 296–97; see also Blackston, 780 F.3d at 357
(“[I]t was plainly a misapplication of Rule 403 to prevent the jury from hearing” testimony
based on the judge’s doubts about the credibility of the testimony.); Adams, 2 F. Supp. 2d at
1089 (“The weighing process under Rule 403 requires the judge to assume the credibility of
a witness, because to do otherwise would usurp the jury’s function. Thus, the probative
worth of eyewitness testimony as to an ultimate fact is presumed to be 100%.”) (internal
citations omitted) (citing CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND P ROCEDURE : EVIDENCE § 5214).
145. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
146. Paul F. Rothstein, Some Themes in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED.
B.J. 21, 29 (1974) (“For example, Rule 403, which apparently cuts across the entire body of
the Rules, allows ad hoc exclusion where prejudice, time, and the like are deemed to
outweigh probativity.”). The exception is a conviction for an offense involving false
statement or deceit under Rule 609(a)(2). FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
147. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules.
148. See FED. R. EVID. 404–05.
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because it is a similar offense that tends to show the defendant’s intent or
mens rea? If the judge nevertheless thinks that there is a substantial danger
that the evidence will tempt the jury to lapse into forbidden character
reasoning, the judge may exclude the evidence as unfairly prejudicial. 149
That might be the case if, albeit similar to the charged offense, the
uncharged crime is much more heinous than the charged offense. 150 Thus,
courts may quite properly consider context—the character prohibition
codified in Rules 404 and 405—to inform the meaning of “unfair
prejudice” in Rule 403.
(2) Using a Prohibition in One Statutory Provision to Limit the Scope of
Another Provision
Clarifying the meaning of a separate statutory provision is not the only
legitimate use of contextual interpretation. It may also be used to limit the
meaning of one provision to prevent the effective nullification of another
provision.151 Consider Federal Rule of Evidence 410(a)(2), which purports
to completely forbid the admission of testimony about a person’s nolo
contendere plea to a crime.152 A litigant who seeks to introduce testimony
about such a plea when suing that person might contend that the plea equals
an admission or party-opponent statement that is admissible under Rule
801(d)(2)(A).153 However, since Rules 410 and 801 are part of the same
legislative scheme, Rule 410 is part of Rule 801’s context. As context, Rule
410 precludes that interpretation of Rule 801. It is well-settled that in a
coherent legislative scheme, one provision should not be construed to
render another provision nugatory.154
149. 2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 8:23 (rev.
2004) [hereinafter IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT].
150. Id. § 8:24, at 8–122 (citing John T. Johnson, The Admissibility of Evidence of
Extraneous Offenses in Texas Criminal Cases, 14 S. TEX. L.J. 69, 74 (1972)); P.B. Carter,
The Admissibility of Similar Facts Evidence, 69 L. Q. REV. 80, 92 (1953).
151. Horn v. CIR, 968 F.2d 1229, 1239–40 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“A canon of interpretation
cannot nullify part of a statute.”)
152. FED. R. EVID. 410(a)(2).
153. Id. 801(d)(2)(A).
154. Courts use various expressions to convey this notion:
$ The courts should not construe one provision as abrogating another. Sierra
Club v. EPA, 294 F.3d 155, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n
v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,
249 F.3d 1032, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
$ The court should not read one provision as rendering another a dead letter.
Collins v. Sutter Mem’l Hosp., 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 193, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(“Construction of a statute that would render it a dead letter is disfavored.”)
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$

$

$

(citing Goehring v. Chapman Univ., 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 56 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004)); Mabry v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201, 207 (Cal. Ct. App.
2010), superseded by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924.12(b), as recognized in
Rockridge Tr. v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(“California courts, quite naturally, do not favor constructions of statutes that
render them advisory only, or a dead letter.”) (citing Petropoulos v. Dep’t of
Real Estate, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); People v.
Stringham, 253 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)).
One provision should not be interpreted as destroying another. United States v.
Rodriguez, 26 F.3d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1994) (“The cardinal principle of statutory
construction is to save and not to destroy.”) (quoting United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955)); Delarosa v. Boiron, Inc., 818 F.
Supp. 2d 1177, 1186 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Menasche, 348 U.S. at 538–
39); Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 988 F. Supp. 1055, 1063 (W.D. Mich. 1997)
(“The cardinal rule of statutory construction, however, is to save and not
destroy.”) (citing United States v. Bazel, 80 F.3d 1140, 1145 (6th Cir. 1996)).
One provision may not emasculate another. United States ex rel. Thacker v.
Allison Engine Co., Inc., 471 F.3d 610, 617 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated on other
grounds, 553 U.S. 662 (2008) (“The ‘cardinal principle of statutory
construction,’ however, is “to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word
of a statute rather than to emasculate an entire section.’”) (quoting Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 173 (1997)).
One provision may not render another provision ineffective, inoperative,
meaningless, or null. United States v. Thum, 749 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir.
2014) (“It is axiomatic that ‘a statute should be construed so that effect is given
to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant.’”) (quoting Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009));
Lucas v. Jerusalem Café, LLC, 721 F.3d 927, 937 (8th Cir. 2013) (“A reading
that turns an entire subsection into a meaningless aside ‘is inadmissible, unless
the words required it.’”) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
174 (1803)); United States v. Jonson, 325 F.3d 205, 209 (4th Cir. 2003) (“It is
a well settled canon of statutory construction that ‘a statute should be
interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative.’”) (quoting Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979)); United States v. Ahlers, 305 F.3d 54, 58
(1st Cir. 2002) (“[W]e will not readily adopt any construction that renders any
such words or phrases meaningless, redundant, or superfluous.”) (citing LopezSoto v. Hawayek, 175 F.3d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1999)); N.M. Cattle Growers
Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2001)
(citing Bridger Coal Co./Pac. Minerals, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp.,
927 F.2d 1150, 1153 (10th Cir. 1991)); Mail Order Ass’n of Am. v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 986 F.2d 509, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“First, we are to construe statutes,
where possible, so that no provision is rendered ‘inoperative or superfluous,
void or insignificant.’”) (quoting Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA,
704 F.2d 1280, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1983)); J. E. Pierce Apothecary, Inc. v.
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 119, 137 (D. Mass. 2005)
(“An intention to enact a barren and ineffective provision is not lightly to be
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(3) Incorporating a Restriction from One Statutory Provision to Rewrite
Another
In the three lines of authority described in Part I, the courts did not
employ either of the accepted uses of contextual interpretation. To begin
with, they are not simply considering context to remove ambiguities in the
express wording of the provisions into which they are incorporating
restrictions. Moreover, the incorporated restrictions do not take the form of
flat prohibitions on any use of a particular type of evidence, such as Rule
410’s ban on the admission of testimony about nolo contendere pleas;
rather, on their face, the restrictions purport to merely limit the scope of the
evidentiary doctrine set forth in that provision.
As a general proposition, in the textualist era in these situations, it is
unwarranted for the court to import restrictions from one provision into
another. Standing alone, context does not give a court license to rewrite 155
one provision or to add156 or insert157 restrictions stated in another
provision. Even if doing so would be consistent with the general “spirit” of
imputed to the Legislature.”) (quoting Ins. Rating Bd. v. Comm’r of Ins., 248
N.E.2d 500, 504 (Mass. 1969)); Pac Fung Feather Co., Ltd. v. United States,
911 F. Supp. 529, 536 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1995), aff’d, 111 F.3d 114 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (citing Dep’t of Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332
(1994)).
155. Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 61 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Courts are not authorized to
rewrite a statute . . . .”) (quoting Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984)); Qayumi
v. Duke Univ., 350 F. Supp. 3d 432, 437 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (“[I]t is not the function of this
court to re-write the statute.”) (quoting Cofield v. Crumpler, 179 F.R.D. 510, 516 (E.D. Va.
1998)); Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1311 (M.D. Ga. 2018) (“But
this Court cannot rewrite statutes to avoid what it may perceive to be an unintended
consequence or even an absurd public policy result.”); City of Susanville v. Ca. Dep’t of
Corr. & Rehab., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 721, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“We are not at liberty,
however, to rewrite a statute to comport with our notion of wisdom or common sense.”).
156. Fourstar v. Garden City Grp., Inc., 875 F.3d 1147, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“It is not
a judge’s job to add to or otherwise re-mold statutory test to try to meet a statute’s perceived
policy objectives.”); People v. Hill, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11, 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“We do not
have the power to add to statute what the Legislature left out.”) (citing Wells Fargo Bank v.
Superior Court, 811 P.2d 1025 (Cal. 1991)).
157. People v. Superior Court of Placer Cty., 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 116, 125 n.6 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2013) (“In the construction of a statute . . . , the office of the Judge is simply to
ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert [what]
has been omitted”) (quoting CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1858); People v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 149
Cal. Rptr. 3d 196, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“When interpreting statutory language, the
court may neither insert language that has been omitted nor ignore language that has been
inserted.”) (citing People v. Amwest Surety Ins. Co., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997)).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss2/2

2020] LIMITS OF LEGITIMATE CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION 261
the legislative scheme,158 redrafting159 the provision in that fundamental
fashion is an amendment160 within the province and power of the
legislature, not the judiciary. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly
observed, one of the most firmly established principles of statutory
interpretation is that when legislatures choose to include restrictions in one
provision but not another, courts should usually assume that the legislature
did so purposely.161 With only slight overstatement, this principle has been
described as “[a]n inveterate rule of statutory construction.” 162 Courts
broadly support this negative implication because it rests, in large part, on a
common-sense inference.163 The usual circumstances, including a
legislature’s express mention of a restriction in one provision but not
another, make it very difficult to conclude that the omission of the
restriction from the second provision is an oversight.164 For that matter,
several factors can strengthen the inference that the omission was
intentional.

158. In re Racing Servs., Inc., 779 F.3d 498, 504 (8th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e [cannot]
disregard the letter of a ‘clear and unambiguous’ statute ‘under the pretext of pursuing its
spirit.’”) (quoting Gadeco, LLC v. Indus. Comm’n of State, 380 N.W.2d 535, 541 (N.D.
2013)).
159. United States v. Crape, 603 F.3d 1237, 1247 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he fact that
Congress might have acted with greater clarity or foresight does not give courts a carte
blanche to redraft statutes . . . .”) (quoting United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985)).
160. In re Racing Servs., 779 F.2d at 505 (noting that the court “will not correct an
alleged legislative ‘oversight’ by rewriting unambiguous statutes to cover the situation at
hand”) (quoting Estate of Christeson v. Gilstad, 829 N.W.2d 453, 457 (N.D. 2013)).
161. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002) (noting that it is
generally held that when Congress includes or excludes something it is intentional) (citing
Rusello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)); BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S.
531 (1994) (“[I]t is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely when
it includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another.”) (quoting
Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994)); Russello, 464 U.S. at 23 (quoting
United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
162. Schering Corp. v. Sullivan, 782 F. Supp. 645, 649 (D.D.C. 1992), vacated on other
grounds, 995 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Russello, 464 U.S. at 23).
163. United States v. Olmos-Esparza, 484 F.3d 1111, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the
“maxim is ‘a product of logic and common sense’”) (quoting Longview Fibre Co. v.
Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1313 (9th Cir. 1992)); United States v. Crane, 979 F.2d 687, 690
(9th Cir. 1992) (noting the same) (citing Alcarez v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 607 (9th Cir.
1984)).
164. United States v. Neal, 249 F.3d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Under normal
statutory construction, we would not assume that the failure to include some item in a statute
is an oversight that the court may correct.”).
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First, consider whether the provisions were enacted at the same time. If
the provisions were adopted at different times, the drafter might not have
consulted the earlier provision before drafting the second provision.
Second, determine whether the provisions were part of a legislative scheme
that Congress deliberated over for a substantial period of time. When
legislation is hurried,165 it is more plausible that the drafter was guilty of
oversight. Finally, assess whether the provisions are proximate 166 or even
adjacent in the legislative scheme.167 Again, the closer the provisions are to
each other, the weaker the inference of oversight.
Yet, this generalization should not be applied mechanically because there
are exceptions to the general rule.168 The inference of intentional omission
is strong, but not necessary169 or invariable.170 As Judge Posner has noted,
statutory omissions sometimes are inadvertent.171 As previously stated, both
extreme and moderate textualists are skeptical of extrinsic legislative
history material.172 However, moderate textualists ordinarily do not object
to judges routinely considering extrinsic material, even absent a finding that
the statutory text lacks a plain meaning.173 As the Supreme Court has
acknowledged, extrinsic evidence of congressional intent can occasionally
be so strong that the court is justified in implying a restriction or exclusion
165. See, e.g., Uniroyal Chem. Co. Inc. v. Deltech Corp., 160 F.3d 238, 246 (5th Cir.
1998) (“Due to its hurried passage, it is widely recognized that many of CERCLA’s
provisions lack clarity and conciseness.”).
166. United States v. Brandon, 247 F.3d 186, 190 (4th Cir. 2001) (“This interpretation
reflects the fundamental principle of statutory construction that ‘courts are obligated’ to give
effect to Congress’s decision to use ‘different language in proximate subsections of the same
statute.’”) (quoting United States v. Barial, 31 F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 1994)).
167. See case cited supra note 133 and accompanying text; see also In re Fireside Bank
Cases, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 80, 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that the courts should “look
beyond neighboring law to the law as a whole”) (quoting Peatros v. Bank of Am. NT & SA,
990 P.2d 539, 549 (Cal. 2000)).
168. In re Bourgeois, 902 F.3d 446, 447 (5th Cir. 2018) (“But the expressio unius canon
is not meant to be mechanically applied.”); United States v. Local 6A, Cement and Concrete
Workers Union, 832 F. Supp. 674, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that the general doctrine of
expression unius est exclusion alterius “need not be mechanically applied”) (citing Cheney
R.R. v. ICC, 902 F.2d 66, 68–69 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
169. Henry Ford Health Sys. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 654 F.3d 660, 666 (6th
Cir. 2011) (“[T]his canon creates a potential inference, not a necessary one.”).
170. In re R.H., 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 650, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“R.H. also overlooks the
fact that the expressio unius est exclusio alterius principle of statutory construction is not
applied invariably . . . .”) (citing In re J.W., 57 P.3d 363, 369 (Cal. 2002)).
171. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 282 (1985).
172. See supra notes 99–119 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text.
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that was omitted from the statutory language.174 In extreme cases,175 the
legislative history can manifest a sufficiently powerful discernible
legislative intent.176
B. The Application of the Textualist Framework to Decisions Whether to
Import a Restriction Stated in One Federal Rule of Evidence into Another
Rule
Although Section II.A may be lengthy, it enables us to develop an
approach to analyze the recurring fact pattern discussed in Part I. Again, in
this fact pattern,
$

There are two provisions in the Federal Rules of Evidence;

$

One provision expressly imposes a limitation on the evidentiary
doctrine codified in that provision. The provision differs from
Federal Rule of Evidence 410 completely barring evidence of
nolo contendere pleas. Rather, the limitation purports to be a
mere restriction on the scope of the doctrine set out in that
provision;

$

The second provision sets out a different evidentiary doctrine;
and

$

The second provision omits any mention of the restriction.

It is submitted that, without more, contextual interpretation cannot justify
importing the restriction into the second provision in these situations. These
174. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (explaining that the
canons are not mandatory rules but rather helpful tools and that “other circumstances
evidencing congressional intent can overcome their force”); see also Dow Chem. Co. &
Subsidiaries v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 2d 748, 826 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (accepting the
language from Chickasaw Nation) (quoting Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 94).
175. See Settle v. State, 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 925, 928 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (“We are
compelled to add language only in extreme cases . . . .”) (quoting People v. Buena Vista
Mines, Inc., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 21, 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)).
176. See People v. Quiroz, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 925, 930 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that
canons of statutory construction can be overcome when there is “a discernible and contrary
legislative intent”) (quoting People v. Anzalone, 969 P.2d 160, 163 (Cal. 1999)); Samantha
C. v. State Dep’t of Developmental Servs., 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 415, 432 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(“But this rule does not apply if there is a discernible and contrary legislative intent.”) (citing
In re J.W., 57 P.3d 363, 369 (Cal. 2002)); Woodbury v. Brown-Dempsey, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d
124, 132–33 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“Similarly, the ‘courts do not apply the expressio unius
est exclusio alterius principle “if its operation would contradict a discernible and contrary
legislative intent.”’”) (quoting In re J.W., 57 P.3d at 369).
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are not cases in which (a) the wording of the first provision is helpful to
remove an ambiguity in the wording of the text of the second provision or
(b) the application of the second provision will render the first provision
nugatory unless the restriction is read into the second provision. Moreover,
in this setting, drawing a negative implication from the presence of a
restriction in one provision and its omission in another provision is
especially warranted. All of the pertinent factors that solidify the inference
of intentional omission are present: (1) the original Federal Rules of
Evidence all took effect at the same time in 1975;177 (2) the Advisory
Committee and Congress spent years carefully deliberating over the
wording of each provision;178 and (3) in some cases, the lines of authority
discussed in Part I relate to adjacent provisions. In these cases, the
contextual argument for treating the omission as an oversight is clearly too
weak to justify importing the restriction into the second provision.
Therefore, in these situations, courts should import the restriction from the
first provision into the second provision only if extrinsic legislative history
materials manifest a certain type of intent: an extraordinarily clear intent to
altogether bar the admission of a particular type of evidence, not a
qualitatively different, more limited intent to prevent the admission of that
type of testimony under the evidentiary doctrine codified in the first
provision. Using that standard, which, if any, of the lines of authority
described in Part I are tenable?

177. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 15.
178. See id. at 14–15; see also Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond, supra note 75, at 418–19.
Congress spent almost two full years considering the draft rules. The legislation
initially blocking the Court’s promulgation of the rules was dated March 30,
1973, and Congress finally approved the rules on January 2, 1975. During that
period of time, the rules were considered by the House Special Committee on
the Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, the Senate Judiciary Committee, and a Conference Committee. Their
consideration was thorough. . . . Congress added to some rules . . . , deleted
other rules . . . , and modified still other rules . . . . Congress did not give the
draft rules a perfunctory, quick perusal; rather, Congress put the draft under a
microscope and dissected it. The evident care with which the statute authors
chose their words weighs strongly in favor of attaching great weight to those
words.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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III. A Critical Evaluation of the Three Lines of Cases Importing a
Restriction from One Federal Rules of Evidence Provision into Another
Provision
Section II.B proposed a test for determining when it is proper for a judge
to import a restriction from one provision in the Federal Rules of Evidence
into another provision. The test is a “both/and” proposition: the judge must
find both that the extrinsic legislative history establishes a certain type of
intent and that the history expresses that intent in an especially clear
manner. The requisite intent must be to render a particular type of evidence
completely inadmissible—not merely to impose a restriction under the first
provision and bar the admission of that type of evidence under that
provision. Moreover, following a textualist approach, the showing of intent
must be compelling,179 overwhelming,180 or extraordinarily clear. 181 The
question now becomes which, if any, of the three lines of authority
described in Part I can withstand scrutiny under this standard. Do any
amount to misreadings of the Federal Rules?
A. Importing Restrictions from Rule 609 into Rule 608
While Rule 609 refers to a witness’s “conviction,” 182 Rule 608(b) refers
to “specific instances of a witness’s [untruthful] conduct” 183 with no
language indicating that the Rule 609 restrictions apply under Rule 608(b)
if the witness has been convicted of the untruthful act. Nevertheless,
treating Rule 609 as context for Rule 608(b), several courts have held that
Rule 609’s restrictions are implicated when the witness has already suffered
179. See Joseph v. J.J. MacIntyre Cos., LLC, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1163 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (“In some situations, however, what would otherwise appear to be plain language is
interpreted contrarily where there are compelling indications of legislative intent.”) (citing
Cty. of L.A. v. Frisbie, 122 P.2d 526 (Cal. 1942)). But see United States v. All Funds on
Deposit in United Bank, 188 F. Supp. 2d 407, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The language . . . is
plain on its face; and where that is so, then not only is there no need to resort to legislative
history, but also, under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, it is inappropriate
to do so.”).
180. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. v. Murphy Bros. Inc., 125 F.3d 1396, 1398 (11th Cir.
1997), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Murphy Bros. Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.
526 U.S. 344 (1999) (“It is true that ‘[i]n rare and exceptional circumstances, we may
decline to follow the plain meaning of a statute because overwhelming extrinsic evidence
demonstrates a legislative intent contrary to the text’s plain meaning.’”) (quoting Boca Ciega
Hotel, Inc. v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 51 F.3d 235, 238 (11th Cir. 1995)).
181. See cases cited supra note 117.
182. FED. R. EVID. 609.
183. Id. 608(b).
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a conviction for the act.184 The consequence is that although the crossexaminer may pose to the witness the questions allowed by Rule 609—the
date and place of the conviction, the name of the offense, and the sentence
imposed—the cross-examiner may not inquire further to probe the
specifically untruthful aspects of the offense.185
However, the extrinsic legislative history materials related to Rules 608
and 609 are devoid of any clear indication that the Advisory Committee or
Congress intended that a judge must apply the limited scope of inquiry
permitted under Rule 609 when the underlying act also qualifies as a
permissible target of impeachment under Rule 608(b). A fair reading of the
extrinsic materials proves only that the drafters intended to impose certain
restrictions under Rule 608(b) and other restrictions under Rule 609.
Research reveals no passage in the legislative history where the drafters
signaled that they wanted the limitations on Rule 609 to spill over into Rule
608.
Perhaps the strongest hint in the legislative history of importing 609
restrictions into 608(b) is a passing reference to “[p]articular instances of
conduct, though not subject to criminal conviction” in the second paragraph
of the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 608(b).186 Again, there is no such
reference in the text of the rule. Furthermore, even that paragraph does not
avow an intent to either completely foreclose the use of 608(b) when there
has been a conviction or to authorize partially incorporating Rule 609
restrictions into Rule 608(b). Rather, the purpose of the paragraph is to
discuss the probative dangers that can arise under Rule 608(b) and the
safeguards in place to combat those dangers.187
The final sentence of that paragraph notes that “the overriding protection
of Rule 403” is a safeguard that applies to the cross-examiner’s inquiry. 188
The Rule 608(b) case law recognizes that the primary danger is a crossexaminer’s bad faith attempt to besmirch the witness’s character by
184. See United States v. Albers, 93 F. 3d 1469, 1480 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
DeLeon, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1235 (D.N.M. 2018).
185. See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text.
186. FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules. Of course,
when the cross-examiner has the witness’s conviction for the act in hand, there is little risk
that the act did not occur or that the witness did not commit it. Moreover, the availability of
a certified copy of conviction to establish the act reduces the risk that cross-examination
about the act will consume an undue amount of time, which is one of the dangers mentioned
in Rule 403. If that is the primary danger posed by this type of evidence, there is all the more
reason to permit inquiry when the act is the subject of a conviction.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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referring to an act that either did not occur, or which the witness did not
commit. As a safeguard, these cases hold that, on a proper objection outside
the jury’s hearing but on the record, the cross-examiner must recite a goodfaith basis in fact for believing that the act occurred and that the witness
was the actor.189 Of course, when the cross-examiner has the witness’s
conviction for an act in hand, there is little risk that there was no act or that
someone else committed the act. In addition, the availability of a certified
copy of conviction reduces the risk that the cross-examination will consume
an undue amount of time—one of the probative dangers mentioned in Rule
403. Thus, if the dangers mentioned in the Advisory Committee’s Note are
the primary reasons for circumscribing inquiry under Rule 608(b) about an
untruthful act, there is all the more reason to allow inquiry when the witness
has been convicted of the act.
Simply stated, the extrinsic materials do not establish the type of intent
that would satisfy the test proposed in Section II.B. If such intent was
established, when the witness has been convicted of an untruthful act, the
judge ought to not only permit inquiry under Rule 608(b); but also the
judge should not limit the scope of the inquiry to the questions permissible
under Rule 609.190 Therefore, this line of authority fails.
189. See United States v. Courtney, 439 F. App’x 383, 385 (5th Cir. 2011) (not selected
for publication); United States v. Davis, 609 F.3d 663, 680–81 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A
prosecutor is allowed to ask questions in cross examination provided he has ‘some goodfaith factual basis for the incidents inquired about.’”) (quoting United States v. Bright, 588
F.2d 504, 512 (5th Cir. 1979)); United States v. McCallum, 885 F. Supp. 2d 105, 116–17
(D.D.C. 2012) (“Cross-examining counsel, however, ‘must have a reasonable basis for
asking questions on cross-examination which tend to incriminate or degrade the witness and
thereby create an unfounded bias which subsequent testimony cannot fully dispel.’”)
(quoting United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
190. See Courtney, 439 F. App’x at 385; Davis, 609 F.3d at 680–81; McCallum, 885 F.
Supp. 2d at 116–17. The courts’ treatment of Rule 404(b) lends support to this conclusion.
By its terms, Rule 404(b) allows the proponent to introduce evidence of “a crime, wrong, or
other act” if the act is logically relevant on a noncharacter theory:
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses; . . . . This evidence may be admissible for another
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Thus, like Rule 608(b), Rule 404(b) refers to specific acts of conduct
with no mention of the word “conviction.” There is no authority that a proponent may not
resort to Rule 404(b) if the act has resulted in a conviction. Quite to the contrary, the courts
routinely accept the conviction as adequate proof of the act and, on that basis, permit the
proponent to invoke Rule 404(b). 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT, supra note
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B. Importing Restrictions from Rules 803 and 804 into Rule 807
The importation of Rule 609’s restriction is unjustifiable because the
relevant legislative history does not suggest the right sort of intent—
namely, an intent to altogether bar a type of evidence rather than to merely
impose restrictions under a particular provision. Even when a judge can
identify an indication of that intent in the extrinsic history, given the
textualist devaluation of extrinsic history, the judge ought to import the
restriction only if the history clearly and powerfully establishes that intent.
In part, that is the problem with the “near miss” doctrine, which in effect
imports restrictions from specific Rule 803 or 804 exceptions into Rule 807.
The “near miss” cases read the history of the residual hearsay exception as
manifesting an unmistakable legislative intent to invoke the exception only
in extraordinary circumstances.191 On closer examination, however, the
history is more mixed.
The residual hearsay exception was not a creation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence; the exception existed at common law. One of the leading cases
applying the common-law residual exception was the 1961 decision Dallas
County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.192 In that case, when the
county courthouse collapsed, the county filed suit against its insurer
alleging that a lightning strike—a risk covered by the defendant’s policy—
caused the collapse.193 At trial, the county introduced evidence that the
debris contained charred timbers.194 In defense, the insurer contended that
the collapse was caused by the courthouse’s structural weakness—an
excluded risk.195 To explain the presence of charred timbers, the insurer
proffered a copy of an article in the June 9, 1901, issue of the Selma
Morning Times, which contained an article describing a fire at the
courthouse while it was under construction.196 The trial judge admitted the
newspaper article over the county’s hearsay objection.197

149, § 2:8, at 2-36–41 (rev. 2013). If it so happens that the act has led to a conviction that
otherwise qualifies under Rule 609, the proponent can treat the act as evidence on the
historical merits under Rule 404(b) and use the conviction as impeaching material under
Rule 609.
191. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
192. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
193. Id. at 390.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 391.
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The Fifth Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Wisdom, upheld the
trial judge’s ruling.198 Judge Wisdom stated that there is no legal “canon
against the exercise of common sense in deciding the admissibility of
hearsay evidence.”199 He characterized the hearsay in question as both
reliable and necessary, and he found it “inconceivable . . . that a newspaper
reporter in a small town would report there was a fire in the dome of the
new courthouse—if there had been no fire. He [was] without motive to
falsify, and a false report would have subjected . . . him to embarrassment
in the community.”200 In addition, Judge Wisdom found that admitting
hearsay evidence was necessary under these circumstances: Decades had
elapsed since the 1901 fire, and it was highly unlikely that any witness with
firsthand knowledge would be available.201 With Dallas County as a
benchmark, the common-law courts took a liberal,202 flexible203 approach to
litigants’ requests that courts admit demonstrably trustworthy hearsay that
did not fall within any recognized hearsay exception.
When the Advisory Committee undertook to codify the common-law
hearsay doctrine in Article VIII of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,
the question naturally arose as to whether the Rules should include a
residual exception.204 The Advisory Committee’s initial 1969 draft included
a residual exception,205 but one of the first organizations to respond to the
release of the draft was the Committee of New York Trial Lawyers. 206
Although the Committee conceded that trial judges need some flexibility in
198. Id. at 397–98.
199. Id. at 397.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 396–97.
202. See Butler v. S. Pac. Co., 431 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1970) (“[E]vidence that is
necessary to a proper consideration of the case and that exhibits an intrinsic probability of
trustworthiness ought to be admissible under the liberal federal practice . . . .”) (citing Dallas
County, 286 F.2d at 388).
203. See Walter Prince Rowe, Note, Evidence—Government Advisory Materials
Exception to Hearsay Rule, 27 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1221 (1976) (explaining that “Dallas
County established an approach to admissibility of evidence based not on rigid rules but
rather upon a flexible standard resting on practical considerations”) (citing Dallas County,
286 F.2d at 397); G.G.R., Comment, A Practitioner’s Guide to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 169, 192 (1975).
204. See generally Imwinkelried, Scope of the Residual Hearsay, supra note 43.
205. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 345, 377 (1969) (both 8-03 and 8-04 contained a
generic residual exception).
206. See Jon R. Waltz, Present Sense Impressions and the Residual Exceptions: A New
Day for “Great” Hearsay?, LITIG., Fall 1975, at 22, 22.
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administering evidentiary rules, it believed that the residual exception
accorded judges too much discretion; the Committee feared that such
extensive discretion would make hearsay rulings too unpredictable. 207
Despite this criticism, the Advisory Committee decided to retain the
exception in its 1971 draft.208 In its Note on Article VIII, the Committee
stated that judges need the discretion conferred by the residual exception to
deal with “presently unanticipated situations.”209 The Note specifically cited
Dallas County as an example of how much discretion the provision was
intended to accord trial judges.210
After the Supreme Court approved the draft Rules in 1972 and submitted
them to Congress, Congress intervened to prevent the Rules from taking
effect.211 This was an unprecedented step because Congress had allowed the
Court to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure
without any congressional revision.212 Congress’s intervention created a
veritable “crisis” in the rulemaking process, straining the relations between
Congress and the federal courts.213
The House was the first to take up the Rules. The House referred the
Rules to the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Criminal Justice. 214
The Subcommittee prepared House Report 93-650, which recommended
deleting the residual exception.215 The Report stated that draft Rule 102,
which generally directed courts to construe the Rules to promote the
ascertainment of truth and just outcomes,216 gave the trial judiciary
adequate discretion. The Report added that a residual exception would
207. See id.
208. Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 422, 439 (1971).
209. Id. at 437.
210. Id.
211. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 7077 (1973).
212. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 6, at 244. The primary motivation
for congressional action was the extensive backlash against draft Article V privileges.
IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 6, at 244 (stating the draft privilege
provisions proved to be “emotionally provocative”).
213. Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary
Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 675, 682–85 (1975). Congress had previously accorded the
Court virtual autonomy in rulemaking.
214. KENNETH R. REDDEN & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL 307 (1975).
215. Jon Waltz, Rule 803—Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of Declarants Immaterial,
in FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS 13, 40 (PLI Criminal Law & Urban
Problems Court Handbook Ser. No. 94, 1977).
216. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 7079 (1973).
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inject “too much uncertainty into the law of evidence and [impair] the
ability of practitioners to prepare for trial.” 217 The full House eventually
passed House Resolution 5463, approving a version of draft Rules but
adopting the Subcommittee’s recommendation to omit any residual
exception.218 If the legislative history of the issue ended here—if the Senate
had simply endorsed the House position—the proponents of the “near miss”
doctrine would have a much stronger case. Indeed, courts would not even
need the “near miss” doctrine to cabin the residual exception because the
residual hearsay exception would not exist.
However, since Rule 807 is part of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
Senate obviously did not wholeheartedly endorse the House position.
Concededly, the Senate Report inveighs against giving trial judges “broad
license”219 or “unbridled discretion.”220 However, after resorting to that
rhetorical flourish to assuage the House, the Senate voted to reinstate a
residual exception.221 The Report stated that without the benefit of a
residual exception, trial judges might be tempted to “torture” the
enumerated exceptions “beyond any reasonable circumstances which they
were intended to include (even if broadly construed).”222 The Report
asserted that its drafters believed that trial judges would “very rarely”
employ the exception.223 However, like the Advisory Committee, the
Senate Report cited the leading common-law decision, Dallas County as an
“illustrat(ion)” of the discretion that trial judges would enjoy under the
exception.224 The Senate voted to approve the draft Rules, including
residual hearsay exceptions in Rules 803 and 804, in late 1974.225
Since the House and Senate versions of the Rules differed, the matter
went to Conference Committee. The Conference Committee was persuaded
by the Senate Report.226 In one respect, the Committee revised the wording
proposed by the Senate Report. At the urging of the District of Columbia
Bar’s Committee with Respect to Article VIII, 227 the United States
217. Id.
218. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 7052 (1974).
219. Id. at 7066.
220. Id. at 7055.
221. Id. at 7066.
222. Id. at 7065.
223. Id. at 7066.
224. Id. at 7065.
225. The Senate Report is dated October 11, 1974.
226. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 7098–99 (1974) (Conf. Rep.).
227. Paul F. Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62
GEO. L.J. 125, 157 n.167 (1973).
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Congress Conference Committee added a pretrial notice requirement. 228
With that one exception, the Conference Committee members adopted the
Senate position that there should be a residual exception and its proposed
wording for a residual exception found at the ends of both Rule 803 and
Rule 804.229
The Conference Committee then resubmitted the legislation to the House
and Senate. During the House debate, Representative Elizabeth Holtzman—
who, as we shall soon see, played a role in the congressional deliberations
over Rules 803(8)—voiced her opposition to the residual exception. She
urged the House to reject the exceptions as unduly “casual [and] openended.”230 However, over her opposition, both the House and the Senate
voted to approve the Conference Committee version of the draft Rules. The
Federal Rules of Evidence, including the two residual exceptions, took
effect on July 1, 1975.231
Eventually, the two residual hearsay exceptions were consolidated and
moved to its current provision, Rule 807.232 In its current form, Rule 807
requires the judge to determine whether the proffered hearsay possesses
“circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” that are “equivalent” to
hearsay admitted under the expressly enumerated exceptions. 233 That
language certainly requires the judge to compare the overall trustworthiness
of the proffered hearsay to that of the general trustworthiness of hearsay
received under the specific exceptions. However, as Part I explained, the
“near miss” doctrine goes further; under this doctrine, the proffered hearsay
is inadmissible as a matter of law even if it falls just short of satisfying a
specific foundational requirement for the enumerated exception that the
judge deems most apposite to the instant case.
It is true that in both the House and Senate deliberations over the residual
exceptions, some legislators voiced concern about the extent of judicial
discretion under the exceptions, and some pleaded with Congress to omit
any residual exceptions.234 However, when the dust settled, both the House
and Senate had rejected those pleas.235 Moreover, both the Advisory

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 7105.
Id. at 7105–06.
120 CONG. REC. 40891–93 (1974).
Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
FED. R. EVID. 807.
See supra notes 219–29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 219–29 and accompanying text.
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Committee Note236 and the Senate Report237 pointed to the relatively liberal
common-law decision in Dallas County as an example of how much
discretion judges would wield under the statutes. Additionally, neither the
Senate nor the Conference Committee Reports suggested that a judge
should bar evidence under the residual exceptions merely on the ground
that the proffered hearsay fell just short of satisfying the specific
requirements of an enumerated hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804.
In short, like the limitation that some courts have imposed on Rule
608(b) evidence when there has been a conviction for an untruthful act, the
“near miss” doctrine fails the standard set forth in Section II.B. The
imposition of the Rule 609 restriction into Rule 608(b) is unsound because
the legislative history does not prove the right type of intent; that is, to
altogether block the admission of a certain type of evidence. Similarly, the
“near miss” doctrine fails because a careful review of the residual
exception’s legislative history does not establish that the drafters
manifested an extraordinarily clear intent to narrow the discretion that
judges possessed under progressive, common-law decisions such as Dallas
County.
C. Importing Restrictions from Federal Rule 803(8) into Rule 803(6)
Part I pointed out that in United States v. Oates,238 a drug prosecution,
the Second Circuit contemplated the interaction between the official record
hearsay exception codified in Rule 803(8) and the business entry exception
set out in Rule 803(6).239 The court decided to exclude a report by forensic
chemists in the employ of the United States Customs Service. 240 En route to
its final decision, the court reached a number of intermediate conclusions:
(1) the chemists were “law enforcement personnel” within the ambit of
then-existing Rule 803(8)(B)’s exclusion of matters observed by such
personnel;241 (2) the determination in the report that the substance analyzed
was heroin was a “factual finding” under then-existing Rule 803(8)(C),
which forbade the admission of such findings against a criminal accused; 242
and (3) there was a Congressional concern that the introduction of such
reports would violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See FED. R. EVID. art. VII advisory committee’s notes to 1972 amendment.
See S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 7065 (1974).
See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977); see supra Part I.
Oates, 560 F.2d at 48, 68, 83–84.
Id. at 48–49.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 67, 84.
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regardless of whether the reports were admitted under Rule 803(6) or Rule
803(8).243
Oates has proven to be a controversial decision.244 For example, some
courts have disagreed with Oates’ characterization of laboratory chemists
as “law enforcement personnel.”245 These courts reason that an intolerable
concern about law enforcement bias in the preparation of the report exists
only when the hearsay writing is a document—such as an arrest report that
is the product of a directly adversarial confrontation between the police and
a citizen. Other courts have distinguished Oates. They contend that the
Oates court overstated the constraints imposed by the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause.246 According to these courts, a declarant’s report
should be admissible under Rule 803(6) at least when the declarant testifies
and is subjected to cross-examination.247 If the purpose of the exclusion is
to safeguard Confrontation Clause rights, but the declarant appears in court
and permits confrontation, it does not serve the purpose of the exclusion to
apply the rule; the declarant’s appearance as a witness satisfies the
Confrontation Clause.
However, those issues are not our present concern. Our focus is on a
particular aspect of the Oates decision: the court’s conclusion that Congress
had clearly manifested an intent that if a report was inadmissible under Rule
803(8), the report could not be admitted under Rule 803(6). Oates’ detailed
analysis of the legislative history presents a strong case for that proposition
and, more to the point, makes out a persuasive case that satisfies the
standard proposed at the end of Section II.B: an extraordinarily strong
showing that Congress wanted to altogether bar a particular piece of
evidence, not merely impose a restriction under Rule 803(8).

243. Id. at 64, 79.
244. See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA ROTH & JANE
CAMPBELL M ORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 6.02[c], at 379 (5th ed. 2012).
245. United States v. Wilmer, 799 F.2d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Gotti,
641 F. Supp. 283, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing United States v. Yakobov, 712 F.2d 20, 25
(2d Cir. 1983)); Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 129 P.3d 471, 481 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); Michael
H. Graham, Commentary, Business and Public Records Hearsay Exceptions, Fed. R. Evid.
803(6) and (8); Multiple Level Hearsay, Fed. R. Evid. 805, 55 CRIM. L. BULL. 252, 269
(2019).
246. United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 127 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992).
247. See United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1980) (“Confrontation rights
are not violated where the out-of-court declarant testifies at trial and is subject to crossexamination.”) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155–62 (1970)); United States v.
Sawyer, 607 F.2d 1190, 1194 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., concurring).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss2/2

2020] LIMITS OF LEGITIMATE CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION 275
Representative Elizabeth Holtzman played a central role in crafting the
restrictions wrought into Rule 803(8).248 In Section III.B, we saw that she
was on the losing side of the congressional debate over the residual hearsay
exception. In contrast, on this issue, she was on the winning side. During
the House deliberations over Rule 803(8), Representative David Dennis
sponsored an amendment forbidding the receipt of reports reflecting
“matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel”
in criminal cases.249 He contended that this restriction was necessary to
protect defendants’ Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights, 250 and
Representative Holtzman spoke in support of his contention. 251 Thus, two
of the most vocal proponents of the restrictions both rested their argument
on constitutional concerns that would arise regardless of whether the report
was admitted as an official record or as a business entry. The majority of
the House agreed and voted to include restrictive language in Rule 803(8).
The Senate voted to approve a variation of the restriction but reworded
the restriction to be inapplicable when “the author of the report was
‘unavailable’ to testify.”252 As previously stated, the differing versions of
the draft Federal Rules of Evidence—including the differing texts of Rule
803(8)—necessitated a Conference Committee.253 While the Conference
Committee sided with the Senate on the issue of the residual hearsay
exceptions, the Committee came down on the side of the House for the Rule
803(8) restrictions.254 After the conference, when Representative William
Hungate, who was both the floor manager for the legislation and a member
of the Conference Committee,255 was explaining the status of reports barred
by the restrictions crafted into Rule 803(8), he flatly and bluntly said, “As
the rules of evidence now stand, police and law enforcement reports are not
admissible against defendants in criminal cases.” 256 Representative Dennis,
another floor manager for the legislation and Conference Committee
member,257 expressed similar sentiments during the House deliberation on
the final Conference version, which included the restriction he had
sponsored. Commenting on the admissibility of a police report barred by his
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Oates, 560 F.2d at 69.
Id. (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 2387 (1984)).
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 70 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. H12254 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974)).
Id. at 71.
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Rule 803(8) amendment, he broadly stated, “I cannot see how anybody
could suggest that introducing such a report is possible or a thing that can
be done under these rules.”258 Representative Dennis made that remark on
the floor on the very day the House approved the Conference Committee
version of the Federal Rules.259 As the Oates court noted, the revised
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 803(8) echoed the concern voiced by
these legislators.260 The Advisory Committee Note states that the rationale
for the restriction on “findings” is that the “use [of such findings] against
the accused in a criminal case” would result in an “almost certain collision
with [Sixth Amendment] confrontation rights.” 261 In summary, the
Advisory Committee and leading figures in the congressional deliberations
over Rule 803(8) made it abundantly clear that the drafters broadly intended
to exclude a particular type of evidence, namely, law enforcement reports
introduced against criminal defendants, on constitutional concerns that
would be implicated regardless of whether the evidence was admitted under
Rule 803(8) or Rule 803(6).
The legislative history related to the Oates issue is readily
distinguishable from the history pertinent to the “near miss” doctrine. The
history most supportive of the “near miss” doctrine consists of statements
by legislators who were on the losing side of the debate over the wisdom of
including a residual exception in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Moreover,
even accepting those legislators’ statements at face value, neither they nor
any committee report stated that proffered hearsay should necessarily be
excluded if the hearsay fell just short of satisfying the specific requirements
of an enumerated exception. The Advisory Committee Note on the residual
exception also does not contain such a statement.
In sharp contrast, the extrinsic history most supportive of importing Rule
803(8)’s restriction into Rule 803(6) consists of statements by legislators
who were on the winning side of the debate over restricting the scope of
Rule 803(8). Furthermore, on the face of the legislators’ statements, they
argued broadly for completely excluding a particular kind of evidence, not
merely imposing a restriction under Rule 803(8). Finally, as the Advisory
Committee Note acknowledges, the winning legislators’ argument rested on
a constitutional concern which would be present regardless of whether the
court admitted hearsay evidence under Rule 803(8) or Rule 803(6). While
the citation to Dallas County in the Advisory Committee Note on the
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at 72 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. H12254 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974)).
Id.
Id. at 68–69.
FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee’s notes to 1972 amendments.
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residual exceptions weakens the case for the “near miss” doctrine, here the
Note lends support to the decision to import the Rule 803(8) restriction into
Rule 803(6).
In sum, unlike the legislative history relevant to either the “near miss”
doctrine or the doctrine importing Rule 609 restrictions into Rule 608(b),
the history pertinent to the Oates issue passes muster under the test
proposed at the end of Section II.B. Here, the extrinsic history contains a
powerful showing of a broad legislative intent to bar a particular type of
evidence, not a narrower intent to prescribe a restriction under a specific
provision of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
IV. Conclusion
It is understandable that there is a nostalgia for the common-law era of
Evidence in the United States. From a commentator’s perspective, at
common law it was exciting that it was possible for the commentator’s
proposal to temporarily become law if the commentator’s writing could
persuade one court—sometimes one judge—to embrace the view. From a
judicial perspective, the advent of the Age of Statutes 262 represented a shift
in power from the courts to the legislatures. Because of this shift, a court
might be tempted to reclaim some of that power by straining the meaning of
a statute to reach what the court considered a desirable result. 263 However,
the separation of powers doctrine requires federal judges to make a
conscious effort to resist that temptation because the amendment of statutes
is a legislative function, not a judicial power.
As we have seen, a court may legitimately rely on contextual
interpretation to construe statutes. It is perfectly legitimate for a court to
look to one statutory provision to eliminate an ambiguity in the wording of
a separate, but related, provision. Thus, courts may consider conditional
relevance under Rule 104(b) preliminary factfinding to interpret “probative
value” in Rule 403 and determine whether that expression includes the
credibility of the source of the evidence. Likewise, contextual interpretation
allows courts to narrow the meaning of one provision if doing so is
necessary to prevent the negation of another. Hence, courts may limit the
scope of Rule 801(d)(2)(A) to preserve Rule 410’s blanket bar on the
admission of testimony about nolo contendere pleas.

262. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 23.
263. See Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., California’s “Restatement” of Evidence: Some
Reflections on Appellate Repair of the Codification Fiasco, 4 LOY. U. L. REV. 279 (1971).
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However, without more—without an extraordinarily strong showing of a
legislative intent to prevent the admission of a certain type of evidence—a
court may not import a restriction from one Federal Rule of Evidence
provision into another simply because the court believes that, as a matter of
evidentiary policy, it would be wise to do so. 264 Contextual interpretation
does not warrant that outcome, and courts lack the authority to “improve”
statutes on that basis 265—especially when construing the Federal Rules of
Evidence. In this setting, it is entirely appropriate to apply the interpretive
presumption that the drafters’ omission is intentional if one provision is
silent on a restriction expressly stated in another provision, particularly an
adjacent one. As previously mentioned, all the Rules took effect
simultaneously in 1975 after a long period of careful deliberation over the
provisions’ wording by both the Advisory Committee and Congress.
Worse still, the court’s imposition of uncodified restrictions runs counter
to the basic thrust of the Federal Rules to liberalize admissibility
standards,266 which is evident in many specific provisions in Articles IV–
X.267 More fundamentally, a bias in favor of admissibility is wrought into
the trilogy of key relevance provisions at the very beginning of Article IV.
264. See Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 279 F.
Supp. 3d 846 (D. Minn. 2017) (supplying an omission from a statute “transcends the judicial
function”) (quoting Nichols v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113, 1118 (2016)); People v.
Flores, 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that the court does not sit as
a “super [l]egislature”) (citing Unzueta v. Ocean View Sch. Dist., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992)); City of Susanville v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 721,
729 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“We are not at liberty, however, to rewrite a statute to comport
with our notion of wisdom or common sense.”).
265. Geisinger Cmty. Med. Ctr. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 794 F.3d
383, 393 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Our task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it.”) (quoting
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989)); In re Bracewell, 454
F.3d 1234, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting the Supreme Courts warning against “‘improving’
plain statutory language”); In re Baker, 430 F.3d 858, 860 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A] court’s role
is to apply the legislature’s statutory scheme, not to improve upon it.”) (citing In re Platter,
140 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir. 1998)); Muench Photography, Inc. v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
Publ’g Co., 712 F. Supp. 2d 84, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The Court’s ‘task is to apply the text,
not to improve upon it.’”) (quoting Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 126).
266. See generally Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402, supra note 8.
267. The Advisory Committee Notes to various Rules indicate that the drafters resolved a
large number of common-law splits of authority in favor of adopting more liberal standards.
For example:
$ Rule 404(b) adopts the inclusionary view that the proponent of evidence of an
uncharged crime may offer the evidence on any noncharacter theory of logical
relevance. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Under the exclusionary conception that many
courts followed at common law, there were a finite number of “exceptions”
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Rule 401 sets out an especially broad definition of “relevant” evidence—
namely, evidence pertaining to any “fact . . . of consequence.” 268 The
Advisory Committee Note expressly states that Rule 401 rejects the
limitation, which some jurisdictions previously followed, that the fact in
question had to be actively “disputed.”269
As the Introduction to this Article noted, Rule 402 announces a general
rule that relevant evidence is admissible unless it is excludable on one of
the listed bases, such as the Constitution or statute. 270 Again, Rule 402
makes no mention of case or decisional law. As a witness predicted in the
congressional hearings, the enactment of Rule 402 “will in all
probability . . . prevent[]” the enforcement of uncodified evidentiary
such as modus operandi and intent to a general rule of inadmissibility, and the
evidence was admissible only if the proponent could fit his or her evidence into
one of the pigeonhole exceptions. See also 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED
MISCONDUCT, supra note 149, § 2:37 (rev. 2013).
$ Rule 703 allows an expert to base an opinion not only on personal knowledge
and hypothetically assumed facts but also on secondhand, out-of-court reports
if it is the reasonable practice of the expert’s specialty field to consider such
reports. FED. R. EVID. 703. At common law, many courts restricted the expert
to firsthand knowledge and hypothetically assumed facts when other witnesses
supplied admissible testimony as to those facts.
$ Rule 801(d)(2)(D) permits the introduction of vicarious admissions if, while
the agency relationship exists, the party-opponent’s agent made a statement
about the performance of his or her duties. Id. 801(d)(2)(D). At common law,
many courts admitted only statements by spokesperson agents who were
authorized to make statements on behalf of the principal.
$ Rule 803(1) recognizes the present sense impression hearsay exception, which
had been a distinct minority view at common law. Id. 803(1).
$ Similarly, Rule 803(18) recognizes the learned treatise hearsay exception,
another minority view at common law. Id. 803(18).
$ Rule 901(b) made it clear that it treats many traditional common-law
authentication techniques merely as “examples” of a broader, liberal standard
set out in Rule 901(a): “To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or
identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”
Id. 901(a); see id. 901(b).
$ Rule 1001(e) liberalized the admissibility of duplicates under the best evidence
rule by defining duplicates broadly as “any counterpart produced by a
mechanical, photographic, chemical, electronic, or other equivalent process.”
Id. 1001(e). The Rule dispenses with the common-law requirement that the
duplicate be prepared at the same time as the original.
268. FED. R. EVID. 401.
269. Id. 401 advisory committee’s notes to the 1972 proposed rules.
270. Id. 402.
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restrictions.271 As the introduction noted, in two cases, the Supreme Court
has recognized that this prediction has turned out to be true.272
Finally, Rule 403 announces that while a judge may exclude relevant
evidence on an ad hoc basis, due to its prejudicial character, the judge may
do so only when the probative value of the evidence is “substantially
outweighed” by such prejudice.273 Congress’s choice of the adverb
“substantially” and the use of passive voice signaled its intent to place the
burden—a heavy burden, in fact—on the party opposing the admission of
logically relevant evidence.274 At common law, many courts had allocated
that burden to the proponent of evidence. However, in the early House
hearings on the then-proposed Federal Rules, Albert Jenner, chair of the
Advisory Committee, stated that “the overall philosophy” of the Rules is to
“place the burden upon he who seeks the exclusion of relevant evidence.” 275
In this light, the burden should unquestionably be on the opponent to
establish that a provision contains an evidentiary restriction. Standing
alone, the presence of a restriction in one Federal Rule provision does not
empower the judge to import that restriction into a separate provision. If the
opponent cannot persuade the judge that the restriction in the first provision
helps clarify ambiguous language in the second provision, or that an
absolute prohibition in the first necessitates a limiting construction of broad
language in the second, importing a restriction is justifiable only when the
271. 22A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE : EVIDENCE § 5199 n.22 (2019).
272. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587–88 (1993) (“Nothing in the
text of this Rule establishes ‘general acceptance’ [from Frye] as an absolute prerequisite to
admissibility. Nor does respondent present any clear indication that Rule 702 or the Rules as
a whole were intended to incorporate a ‘general acceptance’ standard.”); United States v.
Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 46–49 (1984) (“But the Rules do not by their terms deal with
impeachment for ‘bias,’ although they do expressly treat impeachment by character evidence
and conduct, Rule 608, by evidence of conviction of a crime, Rule 608, by evidence of
conviction of a crime, Rule 609, and by showing of religious beliefs or opinion, Rule 610.”).
273. FED. R. EVID. 403.
274. 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, PAUL C. GIANNELLI, FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN, FREDRIC I.
LEDERER & LIESA RICHTER, COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 314, at 3-36–40 (6th ed.
2016).
275. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The
Threat to the Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1465, 1478 (1985)
(quoting Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 77, 87 (1983)). When
Rule 609 was amended in 1990, the accompanying Advisory Committee Note expressly
stated that the burden is on the opponent. FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note on
the 1990 amendments.
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extrinsic legislative history very clearly establishes the sort of legislative
intent described in Section II.B.
The advent of the Age of Statutes has made statutory construction a more
important component of judicial decision-making than ever before. Given
the shift from cases to statutes, legislation has emerged as the dominant
source of American law. In turn, the advent of textualism has caused
another shift. Given the profound textualist skepticism of extrinsic
legislative history materials,276 the priority in statutory construction has
shifted from searching extrinsic history material to finding interpretive
clues in the context of the same statutory scheme. As a result of this
expanded role in statutory construction, the process of contextual
interpretation deserves closer scrutiny. Contextual interpretation has limits
as well as legitimate uses. It is true that no statute is an island unto itself
and, thus, every statute has context.277 Each statute is distinct, and courts
must respect the particular linguistic choices 278 that the legislature opted to
craft into the statute. This debate over contextual interpretation under the
Federal Rules of Evidence is but a microcosm of the much larger debate
over such interpretation in the Age of Statutes. Hopefully, this Article has
made a small contribution to that debate by clarifying the uses and the
limits of contextual interpretation in the particular setting of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.

276. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544–52
(1983); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 362 (1990).
277. Even if the legislature enacts a single section into law, there will almost always be
pre-existing statutes relating to the same general subject-matter. Consequently, those in pari
materia statutes constitute context.
278. See cases cited supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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